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THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY’S ROLE IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY—A
FIFTY YEAR APPRAISAL
JODY FREEMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the little-known “Strategic Studies” staff, within the
somewhat obscure Office of Policy Analysis in the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), released—at no one’s
request—a report entitled Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming? The
report summarized the results of the most current atmospheric
temperature and carbon cycle models,1 which showed that due to rising
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, global average
temperatures could increase by 2 degrees Celsius by the middle of the
twenty-first century. This temperature rise, it said, would “likely” be
accompanied by “dramatic changes in precipitation and storm patterns
and a rise in global average sea levels,” significantly altering
agriculture, disrupting environmental and economic conditions, and
Copyright © 2020 Jody Freeman.
* Archibald Cox Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to the following
former government officials for consenting to interviews and being so generous with their time:
Roger Ballentine, Jim Barnes, Sue Biniaz, Carol Browner, Rob Brenner, James Connaughton,
Eileen Claussen, David Doniger, Bill Drayton, Linda Fisher, Dirk Forrister, Jessica Furey, Gary
Guzy, David Gardiner, Thomas Gibson, Joe Goffman, Tom Jorling, Jeff Holmstead, Lisa
Jackson, Dan Lashof, Michael Leavitt, Andrew Lundquist, Gina McCarthy, Katie McGinty,
Richard Morgenstern, Mary Nichols, Bob Perciasepe, Rafe Pomerance, Bill Reilly, Bill
Ruckelshaus, Stephen Seidel, Gus Speth, Bob Sussman, Sue Tierney, Lee Thomas, Dennis
Tirpak, Karen Wayland, Cathy Zoi, and other former senior officials, who wished to remain
anonymous. To the extent that this account relies on the recollections of people directly involved
in events, it should be acknowledged that memories can be flawed and perspectives can be partial.
My hope is that the account here resonates sufficiently with those most closely involved in these
events and that they regard it as, on balance, a fair telling. I have confirmed with interviewees all
quotes and attributions made to them personally. Any factual mistakes are mine alone. A shorter
version of this Article appears in FIFTY YEARS AT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY: PROGRESS, RETRENCHMENT, & OPPORTUNITIES (A. James Barnes, et al. eds., 2020).
1. STEPHEN SEIDEL & DALE KEYES, STRATEGIC STUDIES STAFF, OFFICE OF POLICY
PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, CAN WE DELAY A GREENHOUSE WARMING?: THE
EFFECTIVENESS AND FEASIBILITY OF OPTIONS TO SLOW A BUILD-UP OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN
THE ATMOSPHERE (1983). The report drew on James Hansen’s work at NASA’s Goddard
Institute, among other sources. The Office of Policy Analysis was within EPA’s Office of Policy
Planning and Evaluation.
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stressing political institutions.2 The study went on to explore various
strategies to slow or limit warming, including some policies that, in
retrospect, seem eye-popping for EPA to even have considered
internally, let alone discuss in a public report, including a 300% tax on
fossil fuels and a ban on both coal and shale oil.3
When Can We Delay? appeared on the front page of the New York
Times, it caused a firestorm in the Reagan White House. The
President’s science advisor disavowed it, calling it “unwarranted and
unnecessarily alarmist.”4
But it wasn’t.
This Article tracks EPA’s contributions to climate change policy
over its fifty-year history, including its work on early reports like Can
We Delay?, which proved both bold and prescient. It recounts how
climate change evolved at the agency, moving from peripheral to
central—from a research project of interest to only a handful of curious
agency staff in the early 1980s to the agency’s top priority by 2010.
EPA’s approach to climate change over the intervening period is best
characterized as constrained—hemmed in by congressional politics,
limited by successive presidential administrations, and held in check by
the courts. For decades, EPA staff contributed to climate policy in a
variety of important ways: by researching, modelling, and analyzing
climate impacts and mitigation strategies; testifying in Congress,
educating the media, and building awareness among the public;
actively engaging in the federal government’s interagency policy
process to inform, advise, and persuade other government officials
about the importance of the issue; helping to develop U.S. foreign
policy and participating in international climate negotiations;
establishing many voluntary programs to reduce greenhouse gases and
improve energy efficiency; and implementing air pollution control
strategies, like emissions trading, through which the agency developed
crucial and relevant expertise. Eventually, the agency did regulate
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, but only after the Supreme
Court confirmed its legal authority to do so, and only once a
sympathetic president, Barack Obama, threw his full weight behind the
effort.

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Phillip Shabecoff, Haste on Global Warming Trend Opposed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21,
1983), https://perma.cc/K6B7-KK6E.
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There are four primary lessons from this account, two about the
American governance system generally, and two more specific to
climate change. The first lesson is that, within our constitutional
system, executive branch agencies cannot take the lead on solving new
problems without solid legal authority and strong political support.
While that observation may seem banal, it has profound implications.
It helps to explain why climate change policy at the federal level has
been so incremental. Agencies depend on Congress for authority and
funding, and on presidents for political direction and sponsorship. It
would have been nearly impossible for the EPA to put climate change
at the top of its agenda in the forty years from 1970 to 2010, with
Congress unwilling to act, Republican presidents opposed, and even
sympathetic Democratic presidents reluctantly putting other priorities
first.
The second lesson is that even when agencies are empowered to
act, regulation is less durable than legislation. Regulation has the
advantage of being flexible: statutes often leave room for
interpretation and new administrations may, within certain legal
boundaries, adopt legal positions that best align with their political
prerogatives. In practice, this means a president can do a lot to change
the impact of the law by taking a broader or narrower view of a
statute’s scope, adopting weaker or stronger regulations, paying lesser
or greater attention to cost or public health protection, and exercising
enforcement discretion to favor his or her own priorities. Such
flexibility has many benefits, but it also creates the potential for
significant policy shifts from administration to administration, which
brings instability and uncertainty. This state of affairs helps to explain
why EPA’s trajectory on climate change has zig-zagged over time to
track the political preferences of the White House occupant, and why
the agency’s legacy on climate change is still not settled. For example,
while EPA during the Obama administration established the first
federal greenhouse gas standards for cars and trucks, powerplants, and
oil and gas operations, those standards were vulnerable to reversal
during Donald J. Trump’s presidency. Indeed, the Trump EPA spent
four years systematically rescinding or weakening every Obama-era
climate rule. Without new legislation, this pattern will continue. And if
the past is any indication, each new round of climate regulations will
be subject to litigation. As a result, the last word on U.S. climate policy
will come neither from Congress nor from executive branch agencies,
but from the courts.
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A third lesson concerns the relationship between the domestic and
foreign policy of climate change. For decades, the consensus view—at
EPA, in Congress, and in the White House— was that an international
climate agreement would precede domestic regulation of greenhouse
gases. That is, a treaty would come first, followed by Senate
ratification, after which Congress would adopt implementing
legislation, which would empower EPA and other agencies to regulate
greenhouse gases and take other actions to fulfill U.S. treaty
obligations. That expectation applied, certainly, when the U.S.
negotiated the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. But when the Kyoto agreement
failed, a new, more “bottom-up” approach emerged that relied on
countries to develop their own emissions targets and actions, rather
than negotiating them internationally. In the years from the Kyoto
Protocol, through the Copenhagen Accord, to the 2015 Paris
Agreement, the question became: “What domestic achievements could
serve as the basis for an international pledge?” That shift made EPA
pivotal to U.S. climate change efforts because the agency manages the
Clean Air Act, the most potent regulatory authority the U.S.
government currently has to drive significant greenhouse gas emissions
reductions. This experience suggests that it is unproductive to think of
domestic and international climate policy as separate or sequential—
they must be deliberately and strategically aligned to move in tandem.
The final lesson is perhaps obvious but still warrants underscoring:
climate change is one of the most complex, vexing, and intractable
political challenges of our time. It is demonstrably unlike other
international problems to which it is often compared, like stratospheric
ozone depletion—which, while difficult, ultimately requires replacing
a limited number of consumer products with largely available and
affordable substitutes. Climate change presents a more formidable and
daunting task with much further-reaching economic, social, political,
and strategic consequences. It implicates poverty, growth,
development, trade, migration, health, and energy security, among
other interests. And the timescale involved requires government
planning and commitment over decades; a poor match for the much
shorter American political system timeline which operates in two-,
four-, and six-year cycles.
Undeniably, fervent industry opposition, and intentional efforts to
mislead and confuse the public, have helped to block action and
politicize climate change, turning it from a scientific matter to a
partisan issue. Yet it still seems overly optimistic to claim that the U.S.
was on the precipice of solving climate change in the 1980s, as some
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have suggested.5 The fact is, Congress was not ready, the
environmental community was barely engaged on the issue, and the
public was not broadly informed, let alone mobilized. At that time, the
harms associated with the greenhouse effect were remote and abstract
compared to the pollution problems people encountered in their dayto-day lives. The country depended on coal for over fifty percent of its
electric power and on oil for virtually all of transportation, and the
alternative technologies and advanced energy management practices
of today—wind and solar power, demand response, distributed
generation, energy storage, advanced batteries, hydrogen fuel cells, cogeneration, and the like, and the artificial intelligence necessary to
optimize these alternatives—were in their infancy.6 This additional
background is not meant to excuse inaction. Surely, we could have
done better; surely, we should have. But it does put EPA’s role in a
larger political context, which helps to illuminate the constraints under
which the agency has labored for all of these years.
I. The 1970s and 1980s: EPA and the Science of Climate Change
A. A Long-Term Research Project
When EPA was created in 1970, climate change was a topic of
scientific inquiry but not yet viewed as ripe for policy. In 1965, Lyndon
Johnson issued a Special Message to Congress on the need for
conservation, which included a specific reference to “a steady increase
in carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels,” something the
president had learned of from a report conducted by his science
advisory committee.7 By 1970, the U.S. had four climate modeling
centers, including the nation’s premier lab, the National Oceanic and
5. See generally Nathaniel Rich, Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate
Change, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/6URT-VSPP [hereinafter Rich,
Losing Earth] (describing lobbying efforts by environmental activists to spur congressional
interest in climate change).
6. See generally MICHAEL RATNER & CAROL GLOVER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, U.S. ENERGY: OVERVIEW AND KEY STATISTICS (2014).
7. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Conservation and
Restoration of Natural Beauty, (Feb. 08, 1965); see also PRESIDENT’S SCIENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, RESTORING THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT: REPORT OF THE PANEL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION (Nov. 1965) (including an analysis from Roger Revelle, Director
of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, on the status of atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide predicting that concentrations would increase by more than 25% by the year 2000, and
that global temperature rise would cause ocean acidification, sea level rise, and other adverse
impacts). In his Message, Johnson said, “This generation has altered the composition of the
atmosphere on a global scale through . . . a steady increase in carbon dioxide from the burning of
fossil fuels.”
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Atmospheric Administration’s Geophysical Research Dynamics
Laboratory at Princeton University.8 President Nixon was also briefed
on climate change.9 He was advised that several cities, including New
York and Washington, D.C., would be swamped by sea level rise if it
continued unabated.10 In 1974, Nixon’s Domestic Policy Council
organized a United States Climate Program to coordinate federal
government research on the impact of weather and climate change on
society.11 The next year, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
produced the first of several reports on atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentrations,12 and the first congressional hearing on the topic was
held in 1976.13 By the late 1970s, various scientific agencies across the
U.S. government had established robust climate research programs, as
had several leading universities and international research institutes.14
In 1978, Congress passed the National Climate Program Act, which
established a coordinated national effort on climate change research,
led by the Department of Commerce.15 The next year, the World
Meteorological Organization and the International Council of

8. The other labs included the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder,
Colorado, at UCLA and the Rand Corporation, in Los Angeles, California. and later at NASA’s
Goddard Space Center in New York, all supported by National Science Foundation funding. Alan
D. Hecht & Dennis Tirpak, Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy
History, 29 CLIMATE CHANGE 371, 375 (1995).
9. Every president since Johnson has been briefed on climate change. Corrected Expert
Report by James Gustave (“Gus”) Speth, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or.
2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC) [hereinafter Speth Report].
10. See Memorandum from Daniel Moynihan to John Ehrlichman (Sept. 17, 1969), cited in
Speth Report, supra note 9. White House advisor Daniel Moynihan sent a memo to President
Nixon saying that he “ought to get involved” with climate change). See also generally DANIEL
YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD
(2011).
11. Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 378.
12. See generally UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERIC
RESEARCH PROGRAM, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, UNDERSTANDING CLIMATIC
CHANGE: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1975); see also ASSEMBLY OF MATHEMATICAL AND
PHYSICAL RESEARCH SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CARBON DIOXIDE AND
CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT REPORT OF AN AD HOC STUDY GROUP OF CARBON
DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE (1979) [hereinafter CHARNEY REPORT].
13. The National Climate Program Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Env’t and the
Atmosphere of the H. Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 94th Cong. 1 (1976).
14. See generally Speth Report, supra note 9, at 6; see also Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at
379.
15. National Climate Program Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 601 (1978) (as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2012)).

freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2020]

THE EPA’S ROLE IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY

2/11/2021 10:53 AM

7

Scientific Unions combined forces to create the Global Atmospheric
Research Program.16
During the agency’s first decade, EPA officials likewise viewed
the greenhouse effect as a phenomenon with potentially serious
consequences, which merited ongoing research, but climate change was
not on the agenda for near-term action. Indeed, the first few EPA
Administrators had other, more pressing, political and legal priorities.
The agency’s first head, Bill Ruckelshaus, had to launch the new
agency. He sought to define EPA’s mission, establish its organizational
structure, advocate for support in Congress, and demonstrate the
EPA’s value to the American public.17 Ruckelshaus also had his hands
full implementing the new landmark Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970 and the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the modern
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts).18 Each of these statutes called for
many complex regulations which would be implemented primarily by
the states. For example, the Clean Air Act amendments required EPA
to set the first national ambient air quality standards and approve
individual state plans for implementation.19 While over time, the
agency would tackle regional air pollution problems (like acid rain)
and atmospheric pollution (like stratospheric ozone depletion),
initially EPA focused on the most pervasive ground-level pollutants
that were fouling the nation’s air, and compromising public health.20

16. In 1979, the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nation’s Environment
Program hosted the first World Climate Conference, which created the World Climate Program
to conduct coordinated research. Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 379.
17. Ruckelshaus focused on highly visible pollution problems like pesticides and auto
emissions, he said, to show that the agency would enforce the new statutes. Telephone Interview
with Bill Ruckelshaus, Former EPA Administrator (May 2, 2019) [hereinafter Ruckelshaus
Interview]; see also Interview by Michael Gorn of William D. Ruckelshaus (Jan. 1993),
https://perma.cc/WE7X-Z387. “The most important imperative, I think, was establishing the
credibility of the agency and demonstrating the willingness of the central government, and the
political process, to respond to the legitimate demands of the people. I thought these tasks were
essential. Second, it was crucial to organize the agency properly and set out some achievable goals.
Third, I selected some issues to take on personally, in order to demonstrate the willingness of
EPA to step up to its responsibilities. There were also some pressing issues like DDT, which
required immediate attention; and enforcement action against three cities.” Id. See also generally,
DENNIS C. WILLIAMS, THE GUARDIAN: EPA’S FORMATIVE YEARS, EPA 202-K-93-002 (1993).
18. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 82 Stat. 844 (1972).
19. 84 Stat. at 1676.
20. It appears from the legislative record, and from the memories of those most closely
involved, that climate change did not figure meaningfully in the negotiations over the 1970 Act,
although Congress took pains to draft a flexible, precautionary statute that included a capacious
definition of “pollutant,” which naturally includes greenhouse gases. Rafe Pomerance, who was
active on the Hill lobbying for the National Clean Air Coalition, said that he could not recall any
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Ruckelshaus’s successor, Russell Train, continued the monumental
task of producing the required air and water quality standards, while
also implementing additional environmental laws Congress continued
to pass, including new regimes to regulate pesticides and toxic
substances, among other things.21 This process would take years. When
President Carter’s EPA head, Doug Costle, took over the agency, he
faced a backlog of regulations, a raft of litigation, and pending
reauthorizations. In light of these more urgent matters, none of the
early EPA administrators treated climate change as a priority.22
Climate change did emerge as an issue, however, in debates over
energy policy during both the Ford and Carter administrations,
particularly in the wake of the 1973–74 OPEC oil embargo against the
United States. By then, EPA had established four “policy evaluation”
offices specializing in particular topics—one of which was energy.23
This group represented the agency’s interests in internal
administration debates over energy policy, including the stringency of
sulfur dioxide standards for coal plants, and whether to adopt a
synthetic fuels program to help reduce the country’s oil dependence.24

discussion of climate change during negotiation of the 1974 and 1977 amendments to the Act. See
Telephone Interview with Rafe Pomerance, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Environment and Development (Mar. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Pomerance Interview] (“No, zero,
as far as I remember. And I went to many, many markup sessions, hearings, the whole thing.
Never was discussed that I recall.”) See Telephone Interview with Tom Jorling, Former Assistant
Administrator for the Office of Water and Hazardous Substances (May 4, 2019) (repeating same
and noting that the inclusion of “climate” in the definition of “welfare” in the Act was intended
to capture more local impacts such as the heat island effect, and ecological effects such as ozone
damaging vegetation).
21. RUSSELL E. TRAIN: ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW, U.S. EPA, EPA 202-K-93-001 (July
1993), https://perma.cc/8VLJ-XCJ2 (excerpting Interview by Michael Gorn of Russell E. Train
(May 5, 1992)).
22. DOUGLAS M. COSTLE: ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW, U.S. EPA, EPA 202-K-93-001 (Jan.
2001), https://perma.cc/C96R-6URG (excerpting Interview by Dennis Williams of Douglas M.
Costle (Aug. 4–5, 1996)) (mentioning climate change only once to note scientific uncertainty).
Bill Drayton, Costle’s Assistant Administrator for Planning and Management, referred to these
statutes as a “wave of legislation.” Telephone Interview with Bill Drayton, Former Assistant
Administrator for Planning and Management (May 9, 2019). Tom Jorling, who served under
Costle as an Assistant Administrator, referred to a “horrendous work load” implementing the
basic statutes and then having the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Toxic
Substances Control Act to manage too. Telephone Interview with Tom Jorling, Former Assistant
Administrator for the Office of Water and Hazardous Substances (May 4, 2019). There was “very
little attention on the future—what was coming down the pike, especially in an era of zero-based
budgeting, when every program had to argue for every budget item, which diverted a lot of energy
and attention.” Id.
23. Jimmy Carter, Energy and the National Goals—A Crisis of Confidence Televised
Address (July 15, 1979).
24. Id.
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While the energy group was focused primarily on the public health
impacts of these pro-coal energy policies, they were “well aware of
climate change,” and “raised it regularly” in arguments with other
administration officials.25 The synfuels policy, for example, would
boost coal liquefaction—a disastrous policy from both a climate and
public health perspective.26 While the Department of Energy was for
it, EPA was opposed.
President Carter understood the connection between climate
change and energy policy; he had been well briefed by his science
advisor, Frank Press,27 who also asked the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) to investigate climate change. In 1979, in response to
Press’s request, a NAS panel chaired by MIT’s Jules Charney issued a
report with some striking projections: carbon dioxide concentrations in
the atmosphere would double by 2030, drastically changing the earth’s
climate, and global average temperatures would be “in the range 1.5°
to 4.5° C with the most probable value near 3° C.”28 Along with Press,
Gus Speth, the Chair of Carter’s Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), urged the integration of climate considerations into energy
policy. Under Speth’s leadership, CEQ issued several reports noting
the buildup of carbon in the atmosphere, pointing to its potentially
severe social and economic consequences, and highlighting the need
for conservation and alternative energy sources, such as solar power.29
To counter the enthusiasm of Energy Department officials for the
synfuels program, Speth also commissioned a report from leading
scientists, 30 which argued that greater use of coal and other fossil fuels
was inconsistent with stabilizing the climate system.31
25. Telephone Interview with Bill Drayton, supra note 22.
26. Id.
27. See Memorandum from Frank Press to the President on Release of Fossil CO2 and the
Possibility of a Catastrophic Climate Change (July 7, 1977) (urging the president to take the
“potential CO2 hazard into account in developing our long-term energy strategy”); see also Hecht
& Tirpak, supra note 8, at 372, 378 (“While attempts to organize a U.S. national climate program
began under President Nixon, it was President Carter who fully recognized the importance of
both climatic variation and climate change, particularly factors to be considered in setting national
energy policy.”).
28. CHARNEY REPORT, supra note 12, at 16–17.
29. Both Speth and Press had been briefed on climate change by Rafe Pomerance, then
head of the environmental group Friends of the Earth, and Gordon MacDonald, a well-respected
atmospheric scientist, who urged them to raise the urgency of the matter with the president.
Pomerance Interview, supra note 20; E-mail from Rafe Pomerance, Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Environment and Development to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor
of Law (Oct. 11, 2019); see also generally, Speth Report, supra note 9, at 13–15.
30. Speth Report, supra note 9.
31. Id. at 22.
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Carter was influenced by Press and Speth, and he understood the
issues. He referred to climate change in speeches, his energy plan
included alternatives to fossil energy,32 and he supported solar power
in particular, taking the symbolic step of putting solar panels on the
White House.33 But facing high oil prices, inflation, and a recession,
Carter’s top energy priority remained the synfuels program,34 which
Congress adopted in the 1980 Energy Act.35 It was a significant set back
for those in the administration who saw climate change as an
increasingly serious risk requiring policy action sooner rather than
later.
When Carter lost his re-election bid to Ronald Reagan in 1980,
the Energy Department was the main federal agency issuing reports on
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and the potential impacts.36 Other
agencies were conducting climate research too, however, among them
EPA, where a small group of entrepreneurial career staff, led by John
Hoffman, had launched their own initiative on climate change.
Hoffman’s group, “Strategic Studies Staff,” was located within the
agency’s Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, and would come to
include people whose names are on the earliest EPA climate studies,
including Stephen Seidel, Jim Titus, and Dennis Tirpak.37 Hoffman
himself had worked on early EPA emissions trading concepts, and
developed a reputation for being innovative and driven.38 As a result,
he was given considerable leeway to follow his own research agenda,

32. Id. at 7–12.
33. White House Solar Panel, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., https://perma.cc/AZT5-5EXC.
34. Email Communication from Gus Speth, President Carter’s Chairman of the Council on
Environmental Quality, to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law (Nov. 9, 2019) (on file
with author).
35. Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-264, 94 Stat. 611 (codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C.). Congress chartered the SynFuels Corporation to provide financial incentives
and loan guarantees to private companies to encourage the production of synthetic fuels as
alternatives to oil. As oil prices dropped, its utility came into question and Congress disbanded it
in 1986. New York Times Staff, U.S. Synthetic Fuel Corporation Shuts Down, NY TIMES (Apr.19,
1986), https://perma.cc/7LP9-LSVZ.
36. See generally INST. FOR ENERGY ANALYSIS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON
FIRST DETECTION OF CARBON DIOXIDE EFFECTS (1981), cited in Speth Report, supra note 9, at
33.
37. Telephone Interview with Dennis Tirpak, Former Director of Global Climate Change
Policy Division, EPA (Mar. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Tirpak Interview].
38. David Doniger, Remembering John Hoffman, Ozone Defender and Climate Protector,
NRDC (Oct. 1, 2012), https://perma.cc/3NHB-ZH88; see also William Drayton, Getting Smarter
About Regulation, 59 HARV. BUS. REV. 81,405 (July–Aug. 1981), https://perma.cc/BUN7-WPGH.
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and next on that agenda was the greenhouse effect, which he thought
was “interesting.”39
Hoffman was swimming against the tide. The early 1980s was an
unlikely time to launch a climate change research program at EPA.
The new Administrator, Anne M. Gorsuch, whom Reagan had tapped
to lead the agency, was proposing to slash EPA’s budget, pulling back
on enforcement, and reducing staff levels to such an extent that one
former Assistant Administrator complained that she had
“demolish[ed] the nation’s environmental management capacity.”40
Yet Hoffman’s staff, operating largely out of view, pressed on with its
work, and in 1983, produced the infamous Can We Delay? report,
which reviewed the climate science to date, discussed the implications
for society, and explored policy options for slowing the projected
warming.41 The report also called for additional research into climate
adaptation and more studies to reduce the remaining scientific
uncertainties (about greenhouse gas sources, sinks, and thermal
sensitivities among other things) as soon as possible.42 No one in the
White House or in senior political leadership at EPA appears to have
requested the study, and it was not subject to the normal internal
review process. There is no evidence Administrator Gorsuch saw it
before its release.43 But it caused a firestorm.44
The Report’s tone was substantially more alarming than the latest
National Academy of Science Report on the greenhouse effect, which
had been conducted at the request of Congress45 and released just three
days later. Although the NAS panel had examined the same studies as
EPA and concluded much the same thing—that warming was human39. Telephone Interview with Stephen Seidel, former Director of EPA’s Stratospheric
Protection Division
(Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Seidel Interview].
40. Joanna Brenner, Neil Gorsuch’s Late Mother Almost Annihilated the EPA. Is History
Repeating Itself?, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/CJ22-ZY97 (quoting former EPA
Assistant Administrator Bill Drayton); see also Philip Shabecoff, U.S. Environmental Agency
Making Deep Staffing Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 1982), https://perma.cc/7KMU-TQGL (outlining
the proposed budget cuts and employee reductions).
41. SEIDEL & KEYES, supra note 1.
42. Id.
43. Seidel Interview, supra note 39.
44. Seidel, who worked closely with Hoffman, recalls that they were able to produce the
Report because climate change was not a high visibility topic. “It was clear that you didn’t want
to be on the front lines of a regulatory matter but this was a perfect long-term issue. It was so far
under the radar, and not even close to being regulated. And we were just a couple of guys in the
bowels of EPA.” Id.
45. See The Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980) (directing the
National Academy of Science to conduct a study on climate change).
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induced and largely caused by fossil fuel consumption and that if
atmospheric CO2 concentrations continued to rise, there would be
significant average global temperature rise with serious
consequences—the synthesis of the NAS Report, which most people
would read, said, “Our stance is conservative. We believe there is
reason for caution, not panic.”46 When Can We Delay? was leaked to
the New York Times, it seemed to contradict this calming tone. The
President’s science advisor, George Keyworth, promptly repudiated it,
emphasizing that “no actions are recommended other than additional
research at this time.”47
Unfazed, Hoffman’s group at EPA issued another report days
later, this one called Projecting Future Sea Level Rise.48 Citing the
National Academies’ conclusion that global warming was nearly
certain to occur, this report estimated likely sea level rise, based on
scenarios ranging from “the very conservative to the less restrictive.”49
Like Can We Delay?, Hoffman’s report called for additional research
on a faster timeline to help coastal planners mitigate the adverse
impacts.50
It is hard to precisely measure the effect of these reports, written
by relatively low level staffers in an agency no one thought of as leading
climate research. But given the prominent media attention they
received, and the considerable consternation they caused, it seems fair
to say that they helped to raise public awareness about climate change,
and provided fodder for activists, congressional staffers, and the
handful of members of Congress who were pushing for additional
hearings on climate change.51 It bears noting, though, that no one,
46. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, CHANGING
CLIMATE: REPORT OF THE CARBON DIOXIDE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE at xiii (1983); see
NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING
at ch. 6 (2010) (recounting the relevant history); see also Michael Oppenheimer, Opinion, To
Delay Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1983), https://perma.cc/UMN4-QMJB (comparing
the two assessments).
47. Shabecoff, supra note 4. Joe Cannon, the Assistant Administrator of OPPE overseeing
Hoffman’s group, was believed to have leaked the report.
48. JOHN S. HOFFMAN, DALE KEYES & JAMES G. TITUS, STRATEGIC STUDIES STAFF,
OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, EPA 230-09-007, PROJECTING
FUTURE SEA LEVEL RISE: METHODOLOGY, ESTIMATES TO THE YEAR 2100, AND RESEARCH
NEEDS (1983).
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id. at vii.
51. See, e.g., Ozone Depletion, The Greenhouse Effect, and Climate Change: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Env’t Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 99th Cong. 1, 43,
98, 106, 143, 147 (1986) (discussing the 1983 reports).
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including Hoffman’s Strategic Studies Staff, was suggesting that EPA
embark on a regulatory program to control greenhouse gases.
The EPA was soon in transition. Administrator Gorsuch had been
forced to resign in a scandal, and Bill Ruckelshaus returned to the
agency at the President’s request.52 Ruckelshaus knew about climate
change, and he mentioned it in some important speeches.53 He also
recalled discussing it with President Reagan, whom he described as “a
skeptic but with an open mind and willing to listen; genuinely curious
about it.”54 But climate change was still relatively abstract—a
“question being studied.”55 After Gorsuch’s tenure, which was widely
viewed as disastrous, Ruckelshaus spent his second tour as EPA
administrator rebuilding the agency’s relationship with Congress and
restoring morale.56
When Ruckelshaus stepped down at the end of Reagan’s first
term, Lee Thomas became Administrator.57 Thomas had come to EPA
from the Federal Emergency Management Administration. He had
briefly run EPA’s Solid Waste office. But he had little experience with
air pollution, had “never dealt with ozone depletion or climate
change,” and by his own admission “knew nothing about either.” 58
After briefings from OPPE staff, however, Thomas came to appreciate
the importance of both problems, and recognized that they were
connected. Of the two, ozone had gained political traction first, and
Thomas would spend most of his tenure advocating for a regulatory
response.
In the mid 1970s, scientists had determined that the ozone layer—
which absorbs harmful ultraviolet radiation in the upper atmosphere—
52. Steven R. Weisman, President Names Ruckelshaus Head of Troubled E.P.A., N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 1983), https://perma.cc/7BRR-48BC.
53. See e.g., William D. Ruckelshaus, Remarks at Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, June 21, 1984. Ex. E-57 at 6-7, cited in Speth Report, supra note 8.
54. Ruckelshaus Interview, supra note 17.
55. Id.
56. Gorsuch’s impact on EPA career staff morale was satirized famously in a series of
Doonesbury cartoons in January 1983, which featured an agency employee sitting out on a ledge
and threatening to jump unless the Administrator “publicly admits that the purpose of the
Environmental Protection Agency is to protect the environment.” Gary Trudeau, Morale at EPA,
DOONESBURY (Jan. 28, 1982), https://perma.cc/E9UE-M7EG.
57. Philip Shabecoff, President Names Toxic Waste Chief to Head the E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 1984), https://perma.cc/RB6N-LBH2.
58. Telephone Interview with Lee Thomas, Former EPA Administrator (Mar. 28, 2019)
[hereinafter Thomas Interview]. He recalled first hearing about CFCs when dealing with the
administration’s budget even before he was confirmed as Administrator. The Office of
Management and Budget had zeroed out funding for the agency to conduct studies of ozone
depletion, and, after being briefed, he “went over to OMB and got it restored.” Id.
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was thinning and suspected that the cause was a set of gases called
chlorofluorocarbons, which are commonly used in refrigeration, air
conditioning, and other consumer products.59 Loss of the protective
ozone layer would mean higher rates of skin cancer and cataracts,
along with damage to plants, animals, and agriculture.
Congress held the first hearings on the impact of
chlorofluorocarbons on ozone in 1975,60 and in 1976, the National
Academy of Sciences issued their first report on the problem, which
reflected the scientific consensus that ozone depletion could cause
significant harm to human health and other living organisms.61 In 1977,
when Congress amended the Clean Air Act to address a number of
implementation problems, it also adopted new provisions calling for
research and cooperation on stratospheric ozone depletion, and
authorizing EPA to regulate ozone-depleting substances that could
“reasonably be anticipated to pose an endangerment for the public
health and welfare.”62 In 1978, EPA used this new authority, issuing an
endangerment finding for chlorofluorocarbons, and banning their use
in certain aerosol spray cans.63 Toward the end of the Carter
administration, in 1980, EPA signaled that it might limit CFC
production more broadly, but momentum slowed once President
Reagan took office.64 During Reagan’s first Term, EPA staff worked

59. See e.g., Mario J. Molina & F.S. Rowland, Stratospheric sink for chlorofluoromethanes:
chlorine atom-catalysed destruction of ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974).
60. Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Upper
Atmosphere of the S. Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sci., 94th Cong. 1 (1975). For a more
detailed history, see Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 376–78. At the time, CFCs were a multibillion-dollar business for companies like Dupont, Allied, and Union Carbide, among others. The
chemical industry argued that regulation would be premature and attacked the research as the
work of foreign agents. But Dupont pledged that it would stop producing CFCs if “reputable”
science showed it to be harmful. See OZONE HOLE: HOW WE SAVED THE PLANET (Windfall
Films & PBS 2019).
61. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
HALOCARBONS, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF CHLOROFLUOROMETHANE RELEASE (1976)
(asserting that the impacts of ozone reduction could include increased melanoma and other skin
cancers and “effects on plants and animals of unknown magnitude”).
62. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 725–31 (1977)
(establishing policies for “Ozone Protection”).
63. See EPA, Consumer Product Safety Commission & U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, Certain Fluorocarbons As Propellants In Self-pressurized Containers:
Prohibition On Use, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (Mar. 17, 1978) (describing rules promulgated by the
EPA, FDA, and Consumer Product Safety Commission which banned chlorofluorocarbons in a
variety of products).
64. See EPA, Ozone-Depleting Chlorofluorocarbons; Proposed Production Restriction:
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,726 (Oct. 7, 1980) (proposing a rule
to limit CFC production).
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closely with the U.S. State Department to support international
negotiations over ozone control, which had been launched by the
United Nations Environment Program in 1981. Yet by 1984, those
negotiations, too, were stalled.65
Two events would break the logjam on ozone just before Lee
Thomas took the helm at EPA. First, in 1984, environmental groups
sued EPA over the delayed CFC regulations. To settle the litigation,
EPA agreed to conduct a study on ozone, and issue new regulations by
1987.66 The promised study was underway, with John Hoffman as the
lead, when Thomas became Administrator. (Pivoting temporarily from
his climate change research, Hoffman had stepped in to head up the
agency’s work on ozone.)67 Second, in 1985, scientists published a
paper confirming a giant hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica.68 The
study vividly demonstrated that the impact of CFCs was neither small
nor mostly in the future, as some had argued, but significant and
happening already.69 The striking results created a new sense of
urgency. By the end of the year, twenty-one industrialized nations,
including the United States, had joined the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer.70 The treaty was before the United
States Senate, awaiting consent to ratification, when Thomas became
EPA administrator.71 Now understanding the threat posed by ozone

65. The alliance between EPA and the State Department forged over the ozone issue would
later prove important to establishing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”),
and to negotiating subsequent international climate agreements. See infra, notes 88, 89, and
accompanying text.
66. Hoffman reportedly persuaded the plaintiffs to stand down, advising them bluntly that
they would lose, and urging them to give EPA time to conduct the necessary research and build
a broad consensus for regulation. Doniger, supra note 38.
67. Hoffman reportedly stepped in after EPA’s Toxic Substances Office (which until then
had the lead on ozone), circulated a draft notice stating that chlorofluorocarbons posed no further
risk to the environment. Email Communication from Stephen Seidel, former Manager of the
EPA’s Stratospheric Protection program, to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law
(Nov. 11, 2019).
68. See J.C. Farman, B.G. Gardiner & J.D. Shanklin, Large losses of total ozone in
Antarctica reveal seasonal ClOx/NOx interaction, 315 NATURE 207, 207–10 (1985) (explaining that
O3 predictions are not global and, in fact, climate change has more rapidly affected the South
Pole).
69. See id. (describing study results including data over the five years previous); BRITISH
ANTARCTIC SURVEY: NATURAL ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE OZONE HOLE (Apr.
1, 2017), https://perma.cc/YY6F-NTQN.
70. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Mar.
22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 097, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987).
71. See Ozone Depletion, The Greenhouse Effect, and Climate Change: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Env’t Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 99th Cong. 199–202,
(1986) (Testimony of Lee Thomas, EPA Administrator) (discussing research conducted on ozone
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depletion, Thomas supported ratification. He knew that domestic
regulation was necessary, and he could not argue for limiting domestic
production of CFCs without supporting an international treaty to bind
other nations.
Thomas stuck with the issue. After the Vienna Convention was
ratified, he spent two years urging President Reagan to sign the followon Montreal Protocol, which would cut global CFC production by 50%
over ten years.72 Reagan’s cabinet was split over the agreement’s
proposed mandatory targets. If the U.S. committed to CFC reductions
in a treaty, they would become binding as a matter of domestic law,
which, opponents pointed out, was not true for European countries.
Thomas lobbied hard in support of the Protocol, but others in the
Cabinet, including the president’s science advisor, remained skeptical.
The Secretary of the Interior, Don Hodel, dismissively suggested that
the better solution was for Americans to wear hats and sunscreen—a
remark that was leaked to the press, making him a laughingstock. 73
Major chemical companies like Dupont by now supported a phasedown, having developed substitutes ahead of their European
counterparts.74 At the urging of Thomas and George Schultz, Reagan’s
Secretary of State, the president ultimately was persuaded to support
a phase-down, and he authorized Thomas to negotiate in Montreal.75

depletion and declaring the administration’s support for the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer).
72. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for
signature Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-10 (1987) (requiring developed countries to
achieve a 20% reduction relative to 1986 consumption levels by 1994 and a 50% reduction by
1999); see also Thomas Interview, supra note 58.
73. Robert Gillete, Suggests Wearing Hats, Sunscreen, Instead of Saving Ozone Layer: Hodel
Proposal Irks Environmentalists, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 30, 1987), https://perma.cc/K9KCKA49; see Telephone Interview with Eileen Claussen, Former Director of the Office of
Atmospheric Programs, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
(Mar. 28, 2019) (recalling EPA staff being asked to analyze the cost of sunglasses, which she
thought was “crazy.”) [hereinafter Claussen Interview].
74. As a consequence, European negotiators generally worked to block the U.S. proposal.
As a chemist by training, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher understood the problem
better than most and appealed for funds to help the developing world afford new technology. See
generally RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING
THE PLANET (1991); Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of Robert Reinstein & Stephanie
Kinney at 19 (Oct. 5, 2010), https://perma.cc/3LB9-EG35; OZONE HOLE: HOW WE SAVED THE
PLANET (Windfall Films & PBS 2019).
75. Reagan, who had had skin cancer, reportedly said, “If it happens, it’s a catastrophe, so
let’s take out an insurance policy.” OZONE HOLE: HOW WE SAVED THE PLANET (Windfall Films
& PBS 2019).
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This history is worth telling because it laid a critical foundation for
EPA’s evolving role in climate change. Many of the same small group
of agency staff were involved in both ozone and climate research.
During the period between the Vienna Convention and the Montreal
Protocol, EPA became deeply engaged in the interagency process to
develop the U.S. position on ozone controls.
As regulation looked increasingly politically feasible, Hoffman
and Seidel, who had worked together on early climate research, moved
to EPA’s Air Office to work under Eileen Claussen, Thomas’s choice
to manage the ozone effort.76 Once there, Hoffman produced a
comprehensive risk assessment of skin cancer impacts, which proved
instrumental in convincing the Reagan administration that the benefits
of regulating CFCs outweighed the cost. The analysis also noted the
significant contribution CFCs, which are greenhouse gases, make to
climate change.77 EPA’s Science Advisory Board ratified the study’s
findings. The result was that EPA bolstered the record on climate
change while underscoring the need for immediate action on ozone.78
Dennis Tirpak, another early member of Hoffman’s Strategic
Studies staff, had remained in OPPE, EPA’s policy shop, to continue
climate research. Tirpak and a small group of remaining staff,79 now
working under Dick Morgenstern, continued to model and analyze
climate impacts, building on the work Hoffman had begun.80 Thomas
was supportive. He backed his staff’s research on climate change, and
publicly spoke and testified about the greenhouse effect.81
76. Email Communication from Richard Morgenstern, formerly at the EPA and participant
in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law (Dec. 5,
2019) (on file with author) [hereinafter Morgenstern Email].
77. JOHN S. HOFFMAN, ED., OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. EPA, EPA 400/187/001C, ASSESSING THE RISKS OF TRACE GASES THAT CAN MODIFY THE STRATOSPHERE
(1987); OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS:
PROTECTION OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE (1987).
78. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE SUBCOMMITTEE, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, EPA,
REVIEW OF EPA’S ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS OF STRATOSPHERIC MODIFICATION, SAB-EC87-025 (Mar. 1987) (“The Subcommittee believes that the information summarized in the draft
risk assessment supports the conclusion that the possible impact of CFCs on the stratosphere
should be considered a high priority issue for further investigation and analysis by EPA and other
Federal agencies, and provides a scientific basis for the recently initiated international efforts to
address this problem.”). EPA’s Science Advisory Board was now on record, saying climate
change “is real and important.” See also Seidel Interview, supra note 39.
79. The staff included Dan Lashoff and Joel Smith, among others.
80. Morgenstern Email, supra note 76.
81. See e.g., Lee M. Thomas, Global Challenges at EPA, 12 EPA J. 2, 2–3 (Dec. 1986) (“The
burning of coal, oil, and natural gas today adds about five gigatons of carbon dioxide to the
atmosphere each year. . . . Many scientists believe that these chemicals are causing important
changes in the chemical composition of our atmosphere.”).
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Tirpak was well-connected to the international scientific
community, and he knew climate would be “the next big thing.”82 In
1985, Tirpak had attended a scientific workshop on the greenhouse
effect convened by the WMO, UNEP and the International Council of
Scientific Unions.83 The Report from that meeting noted, alarmingly,
that the doubling time for atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations
was likely to be much shorter than earlier thought, once gases other
than CO2 were considered.84 This new appreciation of the problem was
“eye-opening” to the scientific community85 and prompted UNEP
Executive Director Mostafa Tolba to write to Secretary of State
George Schultz about the need for the U.S. to take action.86
The Reagan White House did not support an international climate
accord, judging the science to be too uncertain.87 But at the urging of
EPA and the State Department, the administration did agree to
propose that an intergovernmental body be established to conduct a
comprehensive scientific assessment of the issue,88 which led to the
creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).89
The administration’s support for the IPCC was strategic: it delayed the
need to negotiate an international climate agreement, and put
governments, rather than scientists, firmly in control of the
international climate research program.90 Yet from EPA’s perspective,
82. Tirpak Interview, supra note 37.
83. Id.
84. See generally World Meteorological Organization, Report of the International
Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and other Greenhouse Gases in
Climate Variations and Associated Impacts, Report of the Meeting, Villach, Austria (Oct. 9–15,
1985), WMO World Climate Program Report, No. 661. Dennis Tirpak (at that time on leave from
EPA) attended the Villach meeting.
85. Telephone Interview with Michael Oppenheimer, Former Senior Scientist at the
Environmental Defense Fund and head of its Climate Program (June 20, 2019) [hereinafter
Oppenheimer Interview].
86. See Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 380.
87. Id.
88. See Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of Robert Reinstein & Stephanie Kinney at 6
(Oct. 5, 2010), https://perma.cc/6P7K-X8J7 (discussing the creation of IPCC).
89. Oppenheimer Interview, supra note 84; see also Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 381.
90. After the international scientific meeting held in Villach, Austria in 1985, and a follow
up meeting in Bellagio, Italy in 1987, a group of international scientists had established the
“Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases” to conduct a series of assessments. “At that time, the
U.S. said we need a more comprehensive study and we need an intergovernmental process, and
lo and behold the IPCC was born. It was in part because of the administration’s concern that the
process would get out of control.” Tirpak Interview, supra note 37. Some participants were
concerned that the IPCC would be “rigged against a fair assessment of the science. But we were
wrong. The 1st Assessment came out and the IPCC did a great job. It was mostly left alone, except
at the end when the governments participated in the summaries. Bert Bolin, the first head of the
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it also took a positive step toward building an international consensus
for action, which seemed to mirror the ozone process.
Meanwhile, congressional interest in climate change grew
steadily.91 In 1986, Congress held two days of hearings on ozone
depletion and climate change, with testimony from EPA
Administrator Lee Thomas, NASA’s Goddard Space Institute’s James
Hansen, and then-Senator Al Gore. Gore argued that there was no
significant disagreement in the scientific community about whether the
greenhouse effect was real.92 After the hearing, a group of Senators
requested two studies from EPA, one on the effects of climate change
and the other on possible policy responses—a request that had been
pre-arranged by EPA and congressional staffers.93 In 1987, Congress
passed the Global Climate Protection Act, calling for more research,
and specifically asking EPA and the State Department to develop
policy options.94 And in 1988, Senator Tim Wirth presided over the
dramatic hearing where NASA scientist James Hansen, in a packed
hearing room on a sweltering June day, testified to being “99%
certain” that climate change was the result of a buildup of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere rather than natural variation, and warned
that “it is already happening now.”95 Wirth introduced a far-reaching
climate bill calling for twenty percent emissions reductions by 2020,

IPCC understood that the scientific assessments would be more influential if governments bought
into them.” Oppenheimer Interview, supra note 85. Oppenheimer participated in the
international meetings and worked on the IPCC 1st Assessment and each one since then.
91. See generally Rich, Losing Earth, supra note 5 (describing lobbying efforts by
environmental activists to spur congressional interest in climate change).
92. Ozone Depletion, supra note 51, at 8–11; see also Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 381.
93. See Pomerance Interview, supra note 20 (describing cooperation between
environmental activists, EPA and congressional staffers to arrange the hearings and request the
reports).
94. Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1408, 1408–09
(1987) (establishing a policy to conduct more research on climate change). After the Act’s
passage, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas reportedly tried but failed to “capture a policy lead”
on climate change. Nevertheless, EPA would help to “provide the essential analytical data
necessary for developing consensus in the U.S. on policy actions.” Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8,
at 400 n.23.
95. Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June
24, 1988), https://perma.cc/4GEX-3C8G.

freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete)

20

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/11/2021 10:53 AM

[Vol. XXXI:1

among other things.96 But a majority of Congress was not yet prepared
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. economy.97
Many of the key players from the ozone negotiations, both at EPA
and the State Department, believed that the experience with CFCs
could be a model for approaching climate change.98 But the analogy
with ozone depletion turned out to be flawed.99 Among other things,
there were no ready substitutes for fossil energy, as there had been for
the CFCs responsible for deteriorating the ozone layer, let alone
substitutes that would disproportionately benefit American
companies.100 And the harms from climate change remained remote,
compared to skin cancer rates that would rise because of a thinning
ozone layer. In addition, EPA’s voice was not unified on climate
change. While they recognized the importance of the climate issue,101
some staffers regarded it as a distraction and a drain on scarce
resources.102 And even if EPA wanted to act, it was not clear which
96. See, e.g., National Energy Policy Act of 1988, S. 2667, 100th Cong. (1998) (calling for a
twenty percent reduction in emissions by 2020 and an international global agreement on the
atmosphere; directing DOE to produce a plan to reduce energy consumption by two percent per
year; and requiring the Congressional Budget Office to analyze the feasibility of a carbon tax);
see also Frontline Hot Politics, Interview with Tim Worth, PBS (Jan. 17, 2007)
https://perma.cc/26CV-PMRX.
97. See generally Rich, Losing Earth, supra note 5.
98. See Hecht & Tirpak, supra note 8, at 377 (“With respect to both the issues of CFC and
climate change, there were serious questions of scientific uncertainty, conflicting industry and
government views, interagency disagreement and international negotiations . . .”); see also
Richard Benedick, Lessons from the Ozone Hole, 16 EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1990, at 41, 41–43 (1990)
(describing the similarities between the two issues: potentially serious economic dislocation;
skepticism about the science; entrenched interests with financial incentives to oppose policy, and
politicians who would rather defer action).
99. See Michael A. Toman, Richard D. Morgenstern & John W. Anderson, The Economics
of “When” Flexibility in the Design of Greenhouse Gas Abatement Policies (Resources for the
Future, Discussion Paper 99-38-REV, 1999), https://perma.cc/6A9G-3SC3 (“The relative
inflexibility of the [Kyoto] Protocol with respect to these elements may derive, in part, from a
misplaced analogy between the global warming issue and the highly successful effort to phase out
CFCs under the Montreal Protocol.”).
100. See James Maxwell and Forrest Briscoe, There’s Money in the Air: The CFC Ban and
Dupont’s Regulatory Strategy, 6 BUS. STRAT. AND THE ENV. 276, 276–85 (1988) (“Such industry
heterogeneity provides frequent
opportunities for coalitions of ‘the green and the greedy’, such as that between DuPont and
environmental interests.”).
101. See generally OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND
EVALUATION, EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) (ranking climate change as the top ecological challenge
facing EPA).
102. In the 1980s, the EPA program offices “did not recognize climate change as an emerging
regulatory issue at all. We went and talked to water office, and said this will be a big impact on
water. They were so tied up with mainstream water issues that they didn’t want to have anything
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office would take the lead.103 The policy office was focused on research
and analysis, and the Air Office had its plate full of other things.104
More ominously, the experience with ozone depletion had
galvanized industry opposition: by 1989, a powerful coalition of oil,
coal, chemical, electric utility, and auto sector companies and their
trade associations had effectively woken up. Now, they joined forces,
determined to prevent what happened in Montreal on ozone from
happening again to them on climate change.105 Congressional hearings
and press coverage of climate change increased throughout the 1980s,
and some members of Congress introduced far-reaching bills.106 But
the notion that Congress was on the precipice of passing legislation to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions seems overly optimistic.107 And
EPA was not about to get ahead of Congress.
II. George H. W. Bush: The Rio Treaty and Voluntary Programs
A. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
When running for president in 1989, George H. W. Bush sought
to distinguish himself from his predecessor by promising to be “the
environmental president.” He pledged to support a package of
amendments to re-authorize the Clean Air Act that were then
stalemated in Congress.108 The amendments would extend the
deadlines for states to comply with air quality standards, strengthen
auto emissions standards, overhaul what had become an ineffective air
toxics program, and adopt provisions to implement the Montreal

to do with it. And we talked to the solid waste office. We were trying in those early days to garner
the interest and support from the mainstream part of the agency, and they were so focused on
their main business that they really weren’t too interested. We also went over and briefed the
Pentagon and said, this will be a defense issue. They laughed us out of the room—not really, but
sort of.” Tirpak Interview, supra note 37.
103. Tirpak Interview, supra note 37; Morgenstern Email, supra note 76.
104. The Air office was implementing the Montreal Protocol and working on the Clean Air
Act re-authorization. See generally Claussen Interview, supra note 73; see also, Morgenstern
Email, supra note 76 (explaining that the matter was not ripe for regulation).
105. See generally DIANNE RAHM, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
SCIENCE, THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE (2009); UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, THE CLIMATE DECEPTION DOSSIERS (2015); Neela Banerjee, Lisa Song & David
Hasemyer, Exxon: The Road Not Taken, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015),
https://perma.cc/2GUK-AXRP.
106. See, e.g., National Energy Policy Act of 1988, S. 2667, 100th Cong. (1998).
107. See generally Rich, Losing Earth, supra note 5.
108. Id.
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Protocol.109 There would also be a new program to address acid rain.110
The White House favored a market-based approach and proposed a
bill to reduce sulfur dioxides by ten million tons.111
The package was highly controversial, drawing intense opposition
not only from pro-business Republicans but also from powerful
Democrats concerned about the impact on their automotive, coal, and
manufacturing constituencies.112 Negotiations would consume 18
months and require considerable White House effort.113 The bill was
complex, costly, and controversial, and the new acid rain program
would be a signature achievement. Yet, while the update to the Act
was far-reaching, Congress did not add new provisions on climate
change. The amendments included several provisions that would
indirectly reduce greenhouse gases, however, including the acid rain
program itself, which would help to shift the electricity sector from
over 50% reliance on coal to a greater share of natural gas.114 In
addition, there were clean fuels requirements for the transportation
sector,115 and a mandatory phase out of CFCs to address stratospheric

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. While campaigning in Michigan, Bush declared that it was time to address acid rain.
George H. W. Bush, Address on the environment at Erie Metropark, MI (Aug. 31, 1988). Both
Boyden Gray, the White House Counsel, and Dick Stewart, an Assistant Attorney General in the
Department of Justice, were enthusiastic about the possibility of using market mechanisms to
address air pollution, and advanced that view in the White House. See generally Gabriel Chan, et
al., The SO2 Allowance-Trading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections
on 20 Years of Policy Innovation, 65 NATIONAL TAX J. 419, 445–46 (2012); see also Eric Lindquist
& Ann O’M. Bowman, The “Convenient” Environmental Presidency of George H. W. Bush: A
Kingdonian Assessment at 6, American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting Paper
(2013).
112. Both Representative Dingell (D-Mich.), who managed the Clean Air Act amendment
bill in the House, and Senator Byrd (D-W.VA.) the former Senate Majority Leader, opposed a
strong bill. At the same, time, Representative Henry Waxman, who chaired the subcommittee on
Health and Environment of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, viewed the legislation
as too weak, especially its provisions regulating vehicle emissions. The White House was directly
involved in both the House and Senate negotiations, which took from June 1989 through October
1990. Senator George Mitchell reportedly played a critical role in Senate negotiations, working
with the Bush administration to scale down the bill’s cost. For a more detailed account of internal
deliberations, see Lindquist & Bowman, supra note 111.
113. Telephone Interview with William K. Reilly, Former EPA Adm’r (Mar. 14, 2019)
[hereinafter Reilly Interview] (recalling the significant challenges of passing the bill).
114. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, §§ 401–413, 104 Stat.
2584–2634 (Nov. 15, 1990); see also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit.
VI, §§ 601–603, 104 Stat. 2648–72 (Nov. 15, 1990).
115. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. II, §§ 201–235, 104 Stat.
2471–2531 (Nov. 15, 1990)
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ozone, both of which would help reduce greenhouse gases.116 There was
one new provision directly related to greenhouse gases: sources would
be required to monitor CO2 emissions and report emissions data to
EPA, which the agency would be required to make public.117 This was
a seed planted with future greenhouse gas regulation in mind.118
B. Administration Divisions Over the Rio Treaty
Internationally, with the IPCC’s first assessment due, momentum
was building for a framework convention on climate change. As a
presidential candidate, Bush had invoked “the White House effect” to
combat “the greenhouse effect”119 but he had also said that climate
change would require an international solution.120 Once elected, Bush
appointed Bill Reilly, the former President of the World Wildlife Fund,
as his EPA Administrator. Reilly argued that the U.S. should support
a framework climate treaty “to define the problem and its remedies.”121
Bush’s Chief of Staff, John Sununu, opposed the idea, however,
“arguing that the threat was too tenuous and the cure too costly to start
down the path of international agreements.”122 When news reports
surfaced that the White House was sidelining the issue and muzzling
climate scientists, the President was embarrassed, and Sununu came
under pressure to make things right.123 He approached Reilly for help,
and agreed to his proposal. President Bush would host and attend the
first IPCC plenary in January 1990, and the U.S. would host the first
session of the U.N. negotiations on a climate treaty, to be held in
Virginia in 1991.124
Early on in the Bush administration, Reilly appeared to have an
ally in James Baker, the Secretary of State. In his first official speech,

116. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, §§ 401–413, 104 Stat.
2584–2634 (Nov. 15, 1990).
117. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, § 412, 104 Stat. 2699
(Nov. 15, 1990).
118. The monitoring proposal was developed by the Environmental Defense Fund, which
strongly supported the emissions trading approach in Title IV, and adopted during legislative
negotiations. Email Communication from Joseph Goffman to Jody Freeman (Nov. 7, 2019).
119. George H. W. Bush, Address on the environment at Erie Metropark, MI (Aug. 31,
1988).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Michael Weisskopf, Bush was Aloof in Warming Debate, WASH. POST (Oct. 31,
1992), https://perma.cc/H483-UPA7.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of Robert Reinstein & Stephanie Kinney at 11
(Oct. 5, 2010), https://perma.cc/3LB9-EG35.
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Baker had gone surprisingly far in urging action on climate change,125
encouraging nations to act now rather than waiting “until all the
uncertainties have been resolved.”126 Yet those remarks would be
Baker’s lone intervention on the issue. He subsequently recused
himself from deliberations about global warming, citing his
investments in the oil industry. The real reason though, was apparent
in a message Baker sent Reilly: “Remember Bill, you never beat the
White House,”127 a remark that alluded to Sununu and other members
of Bush’s senior staff, who adamantly opposed an international climate
agreement. Baker was telling Reilly he would be on his own. And
Baker was right. With the U.S. now committed to participating in
international negotiations, Sununu centralized control. He handpicked Robert Reinstein, a trade expert opposed to binding emission
reduction targets, as the lead negotiator.128 At Sununu’s direction, the
United States would accept only voluntary programs that could be
defended on their own terms and would oppose transferring funds to
the developing world.129 As Reinstein put it, there were two no-nos:
“no targets, no money.”130
Reilly’s staff at EPA were deeply involved in research, analysis,
and modeling in the run-up to the U.N. Conference in Rio de Janeiro,
where the Convention would be signed. They had produced two major
reports, which Congress had requested in the 1986 hearings. The first
described potential climate impacts by region and sector.131 The second
analyzed potential stabilization strategies.132 During this period, EPA
staff testified in Congress and participated in inter-agency discussions
125. Baker called for reducing CFC emissions, improving energy efficiency and limiting
deforestation, going beyond anything President Bush himself had said while campaigning. See
generally John M. Goshko, Baker Urges Steps on Global Warming, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 1989),
https://perma.cc/G4JU-MQ7G.
126. Id.
127. Reilly Interview, supra note 113.
128. Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of Robert Reinstein & Stephanie Kinney (Oct. 5,
2010), https://perma.cc/3LB9-EG35.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND
EVALUATION, EPA, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED
STATES: REPORT TO CONGRESS, EPA-230-05-89-050 (1989); See also William Yardley, John
Hoffman, a Force in Energy Efficiency, Dies at 62, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012),
https://perma.cc/HFR3-6LSR.
132. OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, EPA, POLICY OPTIONS FOR
STABILIZING GLOBAL CLIMATE: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 21P-2003.1 (1990); see also Hecht &
Tirpak, supra note 8, at 382. Richard Morgenstern calls these reports “highly influential.” See
Morgenstern Email, supra note 76.

freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2020]

THE EPA’S ROLE IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY

2/11/2021 10:53 AM

25

on climate policy, in which they tried to persuade largely skeptical
DOE, DOI, and White House officials about the seriousness of the
climate risk.133 John Hoffman, who had by now turned his attention
back to climate change, began developing “voluntary” energy
efficiency programs, which could be advertised as business-friendly.134
This approach was a true innovation: EPA’s posture toward polluters
had traditionally been adversarial, but these programs relied on
incentives.135 Hoffman was being strategic, searching for measures to
reduce greenhouse gases that might attract White House interest, and
help to support U.S. participation in international climate negotiations.
(Hoffman would send a young staffer, Cathy Zoi, to pitch the programs
to OMB officials as a way to “stabilize GHGs with a profit to the U.S.
economy.”136) These initiatives included the Green Lights program,
launched in 1991, which encouraged firms to install energy-efficient
lighting, and Energy Star, launched in 1992, in which EPA and DOE
rated the energy efficiency of many common consumer appliances.137
Energy Star labels gave consumers a convenient way to compare
products and savings.138 In Reilly’s view, these programs embodied a

133. Morgenstern Email, supra note 76.
134. Id. (noting that Hoffman had begun this work while at OPPE but developed it now at
the Air Office).
135. Id. The programs were controversial among economists at EPA, who worried about
overstating their effectiveness, and among traditional regulators, who thought the programs were
unenforceable, and gave firms credit for doing what they were going to do anyway. And they
rankled Department of Energy officials, who thought they were in charge of efficiency.
136. Telephone Interview with Cathy Zoi, Former Assistant Sec’y for Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Sept. 30, 2019) (on file with author). “We would be in
these meetings with OMB and CEA and say, here is where we can get all these tons – from lighting
and air conditioning, and office management, etc. etc., and they would push back on our
assumptions or our math, and we’d come back with more programs and more tons. We outlasted
them.”
137. See EPA, GREEN LIGHTS PROGRAM: THE FIRST YEAR, EPA/400/1-92/003 (Feb. 1992)
(describing the first year of the Green Lights Program); EPA, INTRODUCING . . . THE GREEN
LIGHTS PROGRAM, EPA 430-F-93-050 (Dec. 1993) (announcing the growth of the Energy Star
program out of the Green Lights Program).
138. OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL
STEWARDSHIP: EPA’S FIRST TWO YEARS IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION at 5, 21K-1006 (May
1991). Other examples of voluntary programs started in the Bush administration include 33-50 (a
challenge to industry to reduce their emissions of 17 priority toxic chemicals by 33 percent by 1992
and 50 percent by 1995), the Green Chemistry Program (pollution prevention grants), and the
Design for the Environment Program (a green manufacturing program, renamed Safer Choice in
2015). See id. at 4; see also OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS, EPA, GREEN
CHEMISTRY PROGRAM FACT SHEET, EPA 742-F-02-003 (Mar. 2002) (describing the Green
Chemistry Program); see also OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS, EPA, DESIGN
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, EPA744-F-00-020 (Mar. 2001) (describing the Design for
the Environment Program).
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preference for “non-confrontational consensus-building approaches”
to solving environmental problems.139 Voluntary programs fit under
the administration’s “no regrets” banner and were philosophically
aligned with market-based approaches, like the acid rain trading
regime the White House had so enthusiastically supported.
Despite Reilly’s efforts and EPA’s work, from February 1991 to
the Rio Summit in June 1992, the U.S. delegation, at Sununu’s
direction, worked diligently to ensure that the agreement would not
commit the U.S. to specific emission targets. At the conclusion of
negotiations, the Rio Treaty’s stated goal was the “stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.”140 Rather than agreeing to cap emissions at 1990 levels by
2000, as the Europeans had proposed, the U.S. agreed only to “action
plans” requiring industrialized nations to submit reports “with the aim”
of returning emissions to 1990 levels.141 Bill Reilly, the most powerful
voice for environmental protection in the Bush cabinet, had been
rebuffed very publicly during the Rio Convention,142 and the treaty
itself created no mandate for domestic action.
Reilly has lamented that the U.S.’s performance leading up to and
during the Rio Convention incurred “lasting and damaging criticism
from Americans and many in Europe and elsewhere for environmental
obstruction.”143 Here was the world’s richest country, with a proud
history of significant environmental achievements, refusing to commit
to stabilizing greenhouse gases. He felt Rio was a missed opportunity
to commit to goals that the U.S. was fully capable of achieving, and at
a reasonable cost, by relying largely on the already-signed new Clean

139. See Reilly Interview, supra note 113, at 30–31, 49 (praising these programs).
140. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention
on Climate Change, in REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE FOR
A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND PART OF
ITS FIFTH SESSION, INC/FCCC, 5th Sess., 2d Part, at Annex I, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/18 (Part
II)/Add.1 (May 9, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 851.
141. The U.S. delegation also made it clear that the president would not sign the related
biodiversity convention out of concern for U.S. biotechnology patents, among other issues. Karen
Tumulty, Bush, Major Differ on Earth Summit Pact: Environment: The biodiversity treaty’s
financial obligations worry President. Britain’s Leader Says Problems can be Worked Out, L.A.
TIMES (June 8, 1992), https://perma.cc/58H7-JWW2.
142. Keith Schneider, The Earth Summit; White House Snubs U.S. Envoy’s Plea to Sign Rio
Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1992), https://perma.cc/PY45-XSLP.
143. Reilly Interview, supra note 113.
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Air Act amendments.144 But in an election year, during a recession, and
having received little political credit for the Clean Air Act amendments
he championed, President Bush would side with the climate naysayers
on his staff.145
III. The 1990s – Kyoto Protocol and EPA’s Evolving Understanding
of the Clean Air Act
When Bill Clinton won the 1992 presidential election, the
prospects for meaningful U.S. action on climate change seemed to
brighten. His running mate, Al Gore, was closely identified with
environmental issues, especially climate change, from his days in
Congress and had written Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the
Human Spirit, which was published in the summer of 1992, around the
time Clinton picked him.146 Gore’s people filled the administration’s
key environmental posts: Clinton nominated Carol Browner, Gore’s
thirty-seven-year-old former Senate legislative director, as EPA
administrator, while another young Gore staffer, Katie McGinty,
would become a Deputy Assistant to the President and go on to chair
the Council on Environmental Quality.147 At EPA, after twelve years
of Republican control, a backlog of issues needed urgent attention: the
Superfund program, food quality protection, pesticide regulation,
national ambient air quality standards, and more.148 These were
immediate action items linked to clear statutory mandates, court

144. Id. (“Administration analysis indicated that the United States would emit about the
same level of greenhouse gases in the year 2000 as in the year 1990, i.e., that stabilization posed
no burden to the American economy. No new legislation would be necessary. In fact, the vehicle
that, along with appliance efficiency standards, forest conservation, and conversion of coal-fired
power plants in favor of natural gas, was already at hand; the Clean Air Act. We had designed
the law to promote gas and discourage coal and it has done so effectively.”).
145. Bush was faulted for failing to engage on the issue. He “never sat for a full-dress
scientific briefing” on climate change or exercised control over administration policy even after
infighting among administration officials became public or leaders of other industrialized nations
pledged action.” Weisskopf, supra note 123. 121Reilly subsequently criticized the U.S. position in
a memorandum to EPA staff. See William K. Reilly, Memorandum to All EPA Employees:
Reflections on the Earth Day Summit 4 (July 15, 1992).
146. ALBERT GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT
(1992).
147. Browner was Gore’s legislative director from 1988-1991. See NY Times Politics, The
New Team, N.Y. TIMES, https://perma.cc/H7TD-VPAR. McGinty reportedly helped Gore
research Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit and accompanied him to Rio in 1992.
Mattie Kahn, Senate Hopeful Katie McGinty Can Play Ball, ELLE (Mar. 11, 2016),
https://perma.cc/ZH42-WYDN.
148. Telephone Interview with Carol Browner, EPA Adm’r (Mar. 26, 2019) [hereinafter
Browner Interview].
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deadlines, and congressional demands.149 “Climate was still seen as
more of a scientific issue, and the mechanisms of action were longerterm,” recalls Gary Guzy, Browner’s Counselor.150 Browner herself
was more focused on domestic environmental issues than her
predecessor had been.151 She knew climate regulation was unlikely and
was interested in strengthening what she viewed as weak and overdue
pollution rules.152 Climate change was not at the top of her list.
A. The BTU Debacle and the Return to Voluntary Programs
The White House, meanwhile, had included a climate measure in
the president’s economic plan: a British Thermal Unit tax, based on an
energy source’s heat content.153 While not exclusively designed to
address climate change, the tax would raise fossil fuel energy costs and
substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions.154 EPA’s OPPE staff
had done the underlying analytic work to model the tax’s impact on
emissions and the economy. Had it passed, the BTU tax would have
been the most important climate policy adopted in the United States
to date.155 But it failed spectacularly. By summer, Democratic leaders
told Clinton that its prospects were “extremely gloomy,” and key

149. Telephone Interview with Gary Guzy, Former Counselor to the Adm’r and EPA Gen.
Counsel (Mar. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Guzy Interview].
150. Id. “[Climate] was primarily then in the Office of Policy and the specialty of very few
staff. The scientific consensus, imperative, and sense of urgency weren’t there, and it was less
concrete than stratospheric ozone . . . later, in in the context of the negotiations over the Kyoto
Protocol, EPA began thinking about implementation, and the legal authorities it might need. But
before that there was only far more general thinking.”
151. “Reilly had done an amazing job of putting agency on international agenda. I had gotten
a lot of input as I came to EPA about maybe I should start by staying focused on domestic side.”
Browner Interview, supra note 148.
152. “There was bipartisan opposition against [the climate] issue. Carol saw an opportunity
to move forward aggressively on traditional regulatory measures and didn’t want to spend capital
on climate—she realized it wasn’t going to happen and was laser focused on conventional
pollutants, using command and control regulation to maximum effect. It was just a different time.
They came in after H. W. and thought the Clean Air Act tools had been underutilized.”
Telephone Interview with Roger Ballentine, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for Envtl.
Initiatives, and Chairman, White House Climate Change Task Force (Apr. 16, 2019). Others I
interviewed confirmed that climate change was not a priority for Browner and noted that some
at EPA felt frustrated at what they saw as a lack of support. See e.g., Guzy Interview, supra note
149.
153. Roger C. Dower & Richard D. Morgenstern, Energy Taxation in the United States: A
Case Study of the BTU Tax Proposal, 10 INT. J. GLOBAL ENERGY ISSUES 180, 181 (1998) (showing
tax would achieve up 25% of U.S. greenhouse gas reductions called for by the UNFCCC).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Senate democrats were emphatically opposed.156 In the face of furious
lobbying, the administration granted exemption after exemption,
trying to salvage the plan. Eventually, recognizing it was too bloodied
to survive, Clinton jettisoned the idea. Congress instead imposed a
modest gasoline tax of 4.3 cents per gallon and moved on; after
defending the tax vociferously for months, the White House backed
away from the issue.157
The lesson of this experience could not have been lost on
Browner: even with a Democratic Congress, the administration could
not pass a broad-based energy tax.158 She would focus on strengthening
pollution rules, which would prove challenging enough, and not just
because of Republican opposition. Key Democrats in Congress and
influential members of Clinton’s own team were concerned about the
cost of environmental regulations. After Republicans seized control of
Congress in the 1995 mid-term elections, EPA found itself even more
on the defensive, fighting to preserve its budget, and defending
regulations as necessary to protect the public health, and required by
science and law.159
EPA staff would play a prominent role in what became the
administration’s default domestic climate policy: voluntary programs.
On Earth Day in April 1993, Clinton pledged to voluntarily reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, consistent with the
Rio Treaty’s goal of stabilizing emissions. The BTU tax would have
produced a significant share of the required emissions cuts, but once it
failed, the administration combined over fifty voluntary initiatives into
a “Climate Change Action Plan.”160 The programs targeted emissions
156. David Rosenbaum, Clinton Backs Off Plan for New Tax on Heat in Fuels, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 1993), https://perma.cc/HR76-8KG7; see also David Hilzenrath, Miscalculations, Lobby
Effort Doomed BTU Tax, WASH. POST (June 11, 1993), https://perma.cc/5LSN-9E94 (recounting
the lobbying effort against the tax and opposition from David Boren (D-OK), a must-have vote
on the Senate Finance Committee).
157. Eric Pianin & David Hilzenrath, Hill Agrees to Raise Gas Tax 4.3 Cents, WASH. POST
(July 30, 1993), https://perma.cc/HA5M-ZZAU.
158. The BTU tax was “as close to a politically possible energy tax as is likely to be
constructed in the U.S.” Dower & Morgenstern, supra note 153, at 189. The tax was a “close
second” to a carbon tax in terms of its effectiveness at reducing emissions. Id. at 183, 189. Its
defeat was not encouraging for the prospects of other instruments that Congress might use to
address climate change, all of which would raise energy prices for consumers.
159. Browner recalls the switch to Republican control—while obviously creating significant
new obstacles—was in a sense also liberating. The agency could now fight back in a less restrained
manner against a Republican majority hostile to its regulatory efforts. Browner Interview, supra
note 148.
160. WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN
(1993). From the White House, Katie McGinty led the inter-agency effort to coordinate the Plan.
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from the electricity, building, and transportation sectors, and ran the
gamut from specific agreements with particular companies to industryand sector-wide programs.161 They were designed to demonstrate the
emissions reductions potential and economic benefits of energy
efficiency and unlock promising technological innovation.162 A
disproportionate share of these programs were already underway at
EPA or were now being proposed by EPA staff, the groundwork
having been laid in the run-up to Rio by John Hoffman and his team.
B. The Kyoto Protocol
From the mid-1990s on, senior EPA staff were also active in the
White House-led inter-agency process to develop the U.S. position in
international climate negotiations, aimed at implementing the 1992
U.N. Framework Convention. EPA had a track record of working well
with the State Department on the Montreal Protocol and brought
substantive expertise to the Kyoto discussions that no other agency
possessed.163 The U.S. negotiating position for Kyoto was that any
binding commitment to reduce emissions should rely on flexible
market mechanisms, such as cap-and-trade, exactly the kind of
approach that EPA was already successfully implementing for acid
rain.164 EPA staff contributed meaningfully to these policy debates:
they modeled emissions reductions and cost, helped respond to
concerns from Treasury and other agencies over economic impacts,
and dueled with the Energy Department modelers over technology
Telephone Interview with Katie McGinty, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Chair
of the Council of Envtl. Quality (June 10, 2019) [hereinafter McGinty Interview].
161. Examples included updated versions of Green Lights (encouraging private sector
organizations to install energy-efficient lighting to reduce electricity consumption and associated
CO2 emissions), the Coalbed Methane Outreach Program (encouraging coal mining companies
to capture and use as methane from extraction that would otherwise be vented to the
atmosphere), the Source Reduction and Recycling Program (encouraging businesses to reduce
their solid waste and increase recycling to cut greenhouse gas emissions from manufacturing,
transporting, and materials disposal), and the State and Local Outreach Program (granting state
and local governments funding to study solutions to global warming and conduct demonstration
projects). See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-97-163, GLOBAL
WARMING: INFORMATION ON THE RESULTS OF FOUR OF EPA’S VOLUNTARY CLIMATE
CHANGE PROGRAMS 2 (1997); see also Janice Mazurek, The Use of Voluntary Agreements in the
United States: An Initial Survey, OECD ENV/EPOC/GEEI(98)27/FINAL (1998) (evaluating
these and other voluntary programs implemented by the U.S. government).
162. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-97-163, GLOBAL WARMING:
INFORMATION ON THE RESULTS OF FOUR OF EPA’S VOLUNTARY CLIMATE CHANGE
PROGRAMs 3 (1997).
163. McGinty Interview, supra note 160 (describing the White House preference for a
market-based approach, and the need to persuade the Europeans of its merits).
164. Id.

freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2020]

THE EPA’S ROLE IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY

2/11/2021 10:53 AM

31

penetration rates.165 EPA staff were among the most technically
capable, thoughtful, and determined contributors to the inter-agency
process.166
At the first Conference of the Parties meeting in Berlin in April
1995, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, former Senator Tim
Wirth, agreed on behalf of the administration to the “Berlin Mandate,”
which called for emissions targets to apply to developed but not
developing countries.167 In follow-on negotiations, the U.S. announced
that it would support making those targets legally binding.168 That
decision prompted a strong reaction in the U.S. Congress. In July 1997,
five months before the Kyoto negotiations, the U.S. Senate adopted
the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a vote of 95-0. The Resolution was a
“sense of the Senate” declaration stipulating that the United States
should neither sign any agreement imposing mandatory emission
reductions on the developed world without also requiring
commitments from developing countries in the same time period, nor
do “serious harm” to the U.S. economy.169 This verdict looked worse
than it was: in an effort to blunt its impact, the White House had
negotiated the language to make it seem as banal as possible, and even
endorsed it.170 But from the outside, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution
165. Telephone Interview with Sue Biniaz, Former Deputy Legal Adviser and lead climate
lawyer, U.S. State Dep’t (Apr. 14, 2019) [hereinafter Biniaz Interview]; McGinty Interview, supra
note 160; Claussen Interview, supra note 73(“EPA tended to have “the best analysis and best
substance.”“) .
166. Biniaz Interview, supra note 165.
167. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of the
Parties on its First Session, ¶ 2, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 1995),
https://perma.cc/5U4W-FWFH. The UNFCCC itself had referred to “common but differentiated
responsibilities” in light of different capacities and called for the developed world to take the lead
in reducing emissions. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Article 3.1.,
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. Wirth made this commitment after direction from the White
House.
168. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the
Parties on its Second Session, Held in Geneva from 8 to 9 July 1996, Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, Annex, para. 8 (Oct. 29,
1996), https://perma.cc/5XTY-FUZV.
169. Susan Biniaz, What Happened to Byrd-Hagel? Its Curious Absence from Evaluations of
the Paris Agreement, SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE (Jan. 2018), https://perma.cc/2AB5HMEL.
170. See Email from Katie McGinty Former and Chair of the Council of Envtl. Quality to
Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law (Nov. 3, 2019) (expressing the view that the 95-0
vote is misleading, since the administration supported a unanimous vote. The Resolution was an
anodyne instruction “to only agree to a treaty that was not harmful to the US economy. We had
no intention to do anything other than that and were confident that we would negotiate an
agreement good BOTH for the economy and the environment.”); see also Telephone Interview
with Roger Ballentine, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for Envtl. Initiatives, and
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seemed like a slap in the face, and it presaged the future. The U.S.
signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, committing to a 7% reduction in
emissions by 2012, in an agreement that, as expected, imposed binding
targets only on developed countries.171 And the Clinton administration,
recognizing that it could not succeed, would never submit it to the
Senate for advice and consent to ratification.172
C. EPA’s Thinking Evolves
Meanwhile, EPA’s thinking about its authority to address climate
change was evolving. In 1994, when developing ideas for the Climate
Action Plan, a handful of EPA staff had drafted a series of one-page
proposals on ideas such as tightening fuel efficiency standards,
adopting an energy tax, and capping utility greenhouse gas emissions,
among other things.173 Many of the ideas would require new legislation
or depend on other agencies. Some of the one-pagers suggested steps
the EPA might take with the existing Clean Air Act, like regulating
carbon dioxide as a hazardous air pollutant.174 These proposals were
exploratory, preliminary, and tentative—a thought experiment driven
by the hunt for “more tons” to include in the president’s climate plan.
Each one briefly identified political pros and cons, and implementation
Chairman, White House Climate Change Task Force (Apr. 16, 2019) (recalling that the
Democrats thought a 95-0 vote would make the resolution less relevant, but it didn’t work out
that way).
171. The agreement called for 37 Annex 1 countries (developed countries) to reduce
emissions by an average of 5% below 1990 levels by 2012. A variety of flexibility mechanisms
were adopted to facilitate compliance, including international emissions trading, Joint
Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148.
172. The most optimistic view among those who negotiated Kyoto might have been that
follow up work could make the treaty eventually acceptable to Congress—that with time, the
administration could show how various things the U.S. already was doing (like reducing CFCs,
and good forest practices) would count toward compliance, explain how the cap and trade
structure the U.S. had fought for would make its commitment achievable at an acceptable cost,
and convince skeptical lawmakers that the developing world would eventually do its fair share.
But Kyoto was toxic on the Hill, with hostility coming from powerful Democrats as well as
Republicans. Representative Dingell reportedly remarked, “You people are using up all of my
patience and you’re working on my affection.” And he was evidently not alone. Telephone
Interview with Roger Ballentine, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for Envtl. Initiatives,
and Chairman, White House Climate Change Task Force (Apr. 16, 2019). After Kyoto, the
President established a White House task force led by Todd Stern, and later by Roger Ballentine,
which focused on pushing forward with domestic initiatives like efficiency standards that could be
framed as independent initiatives, not Kyoto implementation.
173. Memorandum from Michael Shelby, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, EPA to
Karl Hausker, David Doniger & Dick Morgenstern, EPA on “‘More Tons’ One Pagers” (May 31,
1994).
174. Id.
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obstacles, but nothing they included nothing approaching detailed
legal analysis.175
Indeed, the thought of embarking on a regulatory program at this
stage was premature. Browner was occupied with other things, and the
White House was developing its strategy for international climate
negotiations. That process would or would not produce an
international agreement, which EPA would or would not have a role
in implementing. The impetus for action would come from the
international arena. No one was proposing that EPA regulate CO2.
After the 1996 presidential election, Mary Nichols, the Assistant
Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation, persuaded Browner
to let the Air Office expand their climate work; she wanted to give
climate change more attention and support.176 There had long been
tension between the Air and Policy Offices over who “owned” climate
change, with some staff from the Air Office thinking that the Policy
Office was not sufficiently “action-oriented.”177 Reilly had favored the
Policy shop, which was dominated by economists, but Browner favored
the regulators in the Air office.178 She trusted Nichols, and Nichols
deputized David Doniger as her representative on all things climate,
including in the administration’s various inter-agency processes.179
The earliest formal expression of the idea that EPA might possess
the authority to regulate CO2 under the Clean Air Act appears in a
1998 EPA memo authored by Doniger for one such inter-agency
process, responding to the Department of Energy’s plan to seek

175. Id. (On a scale of 1 to 10, the proposal to regulate carbon dioxide as a hazardous air
pollutant received the lowest possible preference ranking, at 10: “Such aggressive use of Clean
Air Act Authority may create a backlash in Congress”).
176. Telephone Interview with Mary Nichols, Former Assistant Adm’r for the Office of Air
and Radiation, (Mar. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Nichols Interview]. Mary had been given some advice
by Eileen Claussen the former head of Atmospheric Programs in the Office of Air and Radiation
before leaving for the National Security Council: Eileen told Mary that it was her job to make the
Air Office more central to climate work because it had the technical chops and work ethic to
actually do something about greenhouse gases. Claussen had discussed the Assistant
Administrator job with Browner in 1993 and had asked whether she could “have climate” but
Browner hadn’t yet decided. Claussen Interview, supra note 73.
177. Claussen Interview, supra note 73; Nichols Interview, supra note 176.
178. Nichols Interview, supra note 176; Telephone Interview with David Doniger, Former
Counsel to the Assistant Adm’r for Air and Radiation (Apr. 29, 2019) [hereinafter Doniger
Interview]; Telephone Interview with Richard Morgenstern, Former Assistant Adm’r for the
Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation and Dir. of the Office of Policy Analysis (Mar. 1, 2019).
179. Doniger Interview, supra note 178. “Doniger was omnipresent.” Telephone Interview
with Roger Ballentine, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for Envtl. Initiatives, and
Chairman, White House Climate Change Task Force (Apr. 16, 2019).
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legislative authority to restructure the electricity sector. 180 DOE’s
position was that deregulation would lower electricity costs.181 EPA
argued that, as part of any restructuring, CO2 should be regulated along
with other air pollution from power plants. Doniger recalls DOE
officials balking at the idea of including air pollution provisions,
especially for CO2, which they believed was not covered by existing
law.182 So, he set out to write a memo arguing that CO2 was a pollutant
under the Clean Air Act.183 The memo explained that CO2 was subject
to regulation under various provisions of the Act if EPA made a
threshold endangerment finding that it posed a threat to public health
or welfare. The memo cleverly noted that “existing authorities” did not
“easily lend themselves” to EPA regulating CO2 using a cap and trade
approach (EPA’s preferred strategy), and argued that the electricity
restructuring legislation should clarify EPA’s authority to do so.184
The memo leaked.185 At a 1998 appropriations subcommittee
hearing, Texas Republican Representative Tom Delay, surprised
Carol Browner by brandishing a copy of the memo and asking if she
agreed that EPA possessed the authority to regulate CO2.186 This was
1998, and Delay, along with many other members of Congress, worried
that the Clinton administration would try to implement the Kyoto
Protocol through executive action, despite not having submitted it for
ratification. Browner had not seen the memo187 but answered without
hesitation: “That is a general summary statement about authorities
provided in the Clean Air Act which I would agree with. There are

180. See Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, EPA Gen. Counsel, to Carol M. Browner,
EPA Adm’r (Apr. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Cannon Memo] (discussing the memo, “Electricity
Restructuring and the Environment: What Authority Does EPA Have and What Does it Need”);
see also MARGO T. OGE, DRIVING THE FUTURE: COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE WITH
CLEANER, SMARTER CARS (2015) (describing the memo).
181. Doniger Interview, supra note 178.
182. Id.
183. See generally Cannon Memo, supra note 180.
184. Email Communication from David Doniger to Jody Freeman (Nov. 1. 2019).
185. See GOP Climate Treaty Critics Step Up Oversight of Administration Strategy, INSIDE
EPA, at 7, 7–8 (Mar. 6, 1998) (referring to anticipated Republican oversight hearings: “In
particular, congressional critics are becoming increasingly concerned that the administration may
seek to control greenhouse gas emissions through regulation without winning Senate ratification
of the accord, citing a recent EPA memorandum which suggests that the agency has the authority
to set pollution control requirements for carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act.”); see also
Doniger Interview, supra note 178 (noting that the memo referred to was Doniger’s).
186. See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and
Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1999: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on VA, HUD, and
Independent Agencies of the H. Comm. On Appropriations, 105th Cong. 199–200 (1998).
187. See Browner Interview, supra note 148 (“I was shocked at the question. Shocked.”).
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broad authorities granted to EPA to address certain pollutants,
including those listed, and many others.”188 Delay asked for a formal
legal opinion on the matter, and—with Jon Cannon, EPA’s General
Counsel, sitting behind her—Browner replied, “certainly.”189
Delay’s request thus produced what came to be known as the
Cannon Memo, the EPA General Counsel’s opinion published in 1998,
which takes the legal position that greenhouse gases are pollutants
under the Clean Air Act.190 Cannon’s memo echoes the theme from
Doniger’s earlier analysis, that a market-based approach would be
preferable: “[A] number of specific provisions of the [Clean Air Act]
are potentially applicable to control [greenhouse gases] from electric
power generation. However . . . these potentially applicable provisions
do not easily lend themselves to establishing market-based national or
regional cap-and-trade programs, which the Administration favors for
addressing these kinds of pollution problems.”191 The memo adroitly
walked the line between claiming legal authority, and exercising it—
the latter step, EPA explicitly said, it was not prepared to take.
D. The Seeds of Massachusetts v. EPA
The Cannon Memo formally sent a message, both internally and
externally, that EPA viewed greenhouse gases as within the agency’s
jurisdiction. In doing so, it inadvertently helped an obscure petitioner,
the little-known International Center for Technology Assessment,192 in
its bid to force the agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the
first time—a petition that would lead, eventually, to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.193 The ICTA petition asked
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Cannon Memo, supra note 180 (describing EPA authority to regulate CO2 under the
CLEAN AIR ACT).
191. Id. at 2.
192. International Center for Technology Assessment, et al., Petition for Rulemaking and
Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Motor
Vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act (Oct. 20, 1999), https://perma.cc/JZ64-GBQL; see Lisa
Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENVTL. L. 1, 4–5 (2008) (referring to the
original groups filing the petition as “rather obscure” and explaining that the environmental
community disagreed about the best legal strategy for prompting action on climate change).
193. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Eventually the mainstream environmental
movement, along with several states and local governments, coalesced around ICTA’s strategy.
They filed comments when EPA, at the end of the Clinton administration, put the petition out
for comment, and ultimately joined the litigation challenging EPA’s decision, in the George W.
Bush administration, to deny it. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE RULE OF FIVE: MAKING
CLIMATE HISTORY AT THE SUPREME COURT (2020) (providing a complete history of the
litigation).
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EPA to make an endangerment finding for greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles—in the technical terms of the statute, to
decide whether they “cause or contribute to air pollution, which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”194
Under section 202 of the Clean Air Act, an affirmative endangerment
finding would require EPA to set emission standards for new cars and
trucks and open the door to regulating greenhouse gases from other
sectors of the economy, under other parts of the law.195 The fact that
the EPA’s General Counsel already had issued a legal opinion stating
that greenhouse gases were pollutants under the Act was helpful in that
it paralleled the petitioners’ view that EPA had authority to act.196
The petition presented a conundrum for EPA, however, coming
late in the Clinton administration. Granting the request risked
provoking a backlash in the Republican-controlled Congress, in the
form of an appropriations rider, or worse.197 Denying it, however,
would require the administration to take a position on whether
greenhouse gases posed an endangerment to human health and
welfare, which the agency was not yet prepared to do.198 So, EPA chose
to let the petition sit; assuming Vice President Gore won the 2000
presidential election, his team would have time to decide whether and
how to regulate greenhouse gases.199
That plan was too optimistic.
When George W. Bush was declared the winner of the 2000
election, EPA pivoted and put the petition out for public comment.200
Doing so would create a record and put pressure on the incoming
administration to act on the petition—either to grant or deny it—a

194. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012). This section of the Clean Air Act provides that the
Administrator of EPA “shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of
any air pollutant” from any class of motor vehicles “which in his judgment cause, or contribute
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Id.
195. Id.
196. “Absolutely mattered that Cannon memo was out there. We would have gone forward
anyway, but no question, that it paralleled our position made it helpful.” Telephone Interview
with Joe Mendelson, former Legal Dir., Int’l Ctr. for Tech. Inst. (Nov. 21, 2019) [hereinafter
Mendelson Interview].
197. Doniger Interview, supra note 178.
198. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Cannon, Former EPA Gen. Counsel (Mar. 5, 2019)
(noting that the agency had no process in place to make the endangerment finding).
199. Guzy Interview, supra note 149.
200. EPA, Control of Emissions From New and In-use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 66
Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001); see also Guzy Interview, supra note 149; Browner Interview, supra
note 148.
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decision that could be challenged in federal court.201 On the chessboard
of climate strategy, this move would wind up being very shrewd.
IV. The 2000s: The George W. Bush Administration
The Kyoto Protocol further galvanized industry opposition to
climate policy, and by the end of the 1990s, climate change became
increasingly partisan, even as the scientific consensus about its causes
grew stronger.202 During the 2000 presidential election, Al Gore did
not highlight the issue and often found himself on the defensive about
his environmental record.203 George W. Bush, the former oilman from
Texas, was critical of the Kyoto Protocol but did say that he favored
mandatory limits on carbon dioxide emissions, and would support a
“four-pollutant” bill to address air pollution, including CO2, from the
electricity sector.204 It was a clever maneuver to outflank Gore on an
environmental issue that should have worked in his favor.
After the election, Bush stoked hopes that he would support
climate policy by appointing Christine Todd Whitman, a moderate
New Jersey Republican with a strong record on conservation, to lead
EPA.205 Based on what Bush said on the campaign trail, Whitman
accepted the EPA job planning to work on new legislation to control
power plant carbon emissions, and then use that accomplishment to reengage the U.S. in international climate negotiations.206 Although she
had not discussed carbon regulation with Bush, the “four-pollutant”
bill had appeared in the transition books summarizing the president’s
campaign commitments, which were handed to incoming political
appointees. She felt it was EPA’s job to help deliver on that pledge.207
The White House also convened a cabinet-level committee, under the
aegis of the National Security Council, to discuss climate policy.
Chaired by Condoleezza Rice, the president’s National Security
Advisor, the group, which included Whitman, reportedly held over a
201. Guzy Interview, supra note 149.
202. Powerful firms and trade associations had opposed mandatory limits on CO2, including
Exxon, the American Petroleum Institute, and the National Coal Association. See generally
ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 46.
203. John F. Harris & Ellen Nakashima, Gore’s Greenness Fades, WASH. POST (Feb. 28,
2000), https://perma.cc/2MS9-BEFV.
204. George W. Bush, Speech on Energy Issues at Saginaw, MI (Sept. 29, 2000).
205. David M. Halbfinger, THE 43rd PRESIDENT; Passion for Politics and the Outdoors—
Christine Todd Whitman, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2000), https://perma.cc/HFW5-BXFY (describing
her conservation and environmental record in New Jersey).
206. CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, IT’S MY PARTY TOO: THE BATTLE FOR THE HEART OF
THE GOP AND AMERICA 170 (2005) [hereinafter WHITMAN].
207. See generally id.
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dozen meetings, in which they received briefings from scientists and
reviewed modeling of the economic, energy, and environmental
impacts of a “four-pollutant” bill.208
This White House committee would be eclipsed by another one,
however. In his second week in office, President Bush created the
National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), otherwise
known as the Energy Task Force, led by Vice President Cheney.209 Its
purpose was to devise a national energy plan to address perceived
shortfalls in domestic supply, and reduce what was seen as excessive
U.S. dependence on foreign oil.210 Whitman was a member of this
group, too, and reports being amazed at its disdain for environmental
regulation.211 She believed that the electricity sector could deliver
reliable and affordable energy while at the same time curbing
pollution, including greenhouse gas pollution, which she saw as a
serious problem.212 And she thought Bush thought so too.213 But many
of the Republican party’s core constituencies, which had fought against
climate policy in the Clinton years, were disgruntled over Bush’s
campaign commitments. They thought his support for carbon
regulation had been a mistake in the first place and now wanted it
undone.214

208. Telephone Interview with James Connaughton, Former Chairman of the White House
Council on Envtl. Quality and Former Director of the White House Office of Environmental
Policy, White House (June 13, 2019) [hereinafter Connaughton Interview].
209. The President’s Energy Legislative Agenda, The White House (June 2001),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/energyinit.html.
210. Telephone Interview with Andrew Lundquist, Former Executive Director, National
Energy Policy Group (Apr. 29, 2019) (“At the time, the President was facing blackouts in
California with electricity and natural gas prices spiking; we thought there would be natural gas
shortages, and oil prices were viewed as getting high. This was the number one issue until 9/11.”).
211. Whitman’s committee service was an “eye-opening encounter with just how obsessed so
many of those in the energy industry, and in the Republican Party, have become with doing away
with environmental regulation.” WHITMAN, supra note 206, at 182. Whitman observed that at one
meeting after another they blamed the country’s energy woes and the California energy crisis on
environmental regulation. Id. at 182–83.
212. See Frontline Hot Politics, Interview with Christine Todd Whitman, PBS (Apr. 24, 2007)
https://perma.cc/EAM6-88BC (“I didn’t want to ‘undermine’ coal, and I knew coal was always
going to be there as part of our energy source. But it was a question of doing it in a way that would
still allow us to address the issue of carbon, which I thought we could do, and not totally end the
coal mining industry.”).
213. Id. (“As a governor, [Bush] had imposed carbon caps in Texas, so I noticed.”).
214. Connaughton Interview, supra note 208. “The group included “conservatives, rural and
inner-city democrats concerned about energy price spikes, governors reeling under the California
energy crisis and worried they would be next, DOT and DOC constituencies, and all of the
Cheney network. There was just massive incoming against carbon regulation.”); see also Frontline
Hot Politics, supra note 212 (recounting industry opposition to carbon caps).
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A. Reversing Commitments to Act on Climate Change
The opponents of carbon regulation ultimately prevailed. The
President renounced his campaign position almost immediately after
Whitman returned from a G8 Ministerial meeting in Italy, where she
had given a well-received speech reiterating U.S. support for climate
regulation.215 Whitman was not freelancing: she had cleared her
remarks in advance with the White House.216 But the speech stirred
opposition among those who thought she had gone too far, and it
created an opportunity to reconsider Bush’s position. Shortly after her
return, a letter from Senators Hagel, Helms, Roberts, and Craig was
delivered to the White House citing Whitman’s various remarks on
carbon regulation and asking the president for a “clear understanding”
of the administration’s policy.217
It has been widely reported that the letter from the Senators was
solicited, if not largely drafted, by the Vice President’s office in a setup
enabling the president to reverse his position.218 Indeed, without
consulting Whitman, the president proceeded to sign a letter in
response to the inquiry, announcing that he was abandoning his pledge
to regulate CO2 from power plants and formally rejecting the Kyoto

215. Remarks of Governor Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator, Environmental
Protection Agency at the G8 Environmental Ministerial Meeting Meeting with Representatives of
International Non-governmental Organizations in Trieste, Italy (Mar. 2, 2001),
https://perma.cc/E83S-H59A; Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Angers Europe by Eroding Pact on
Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2001), https://perma.cc/P97Z-7XT3.
216. See generally Gregg Easterbook, Hostile Environment, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug.
19, 2001), https://perma.cc/XS9C-E28G (noting that a Bush position paper showed he favored
controls on carbon dioxide); see also WHITMAN, supra note 206207, at 171 (noting that Whitman
got “the green light” on her speech from both Condoleezza Rice, the president’s National Security
Advisor, and Andy Card, his Chief of Staff).
217. On the same day, Whitman had sent Bush a frank private letter about the Trieste
meeting, in which she urged U.S. leadership in international climate negotiations, which she called
“a credibility issue for the administration”. See Memorandum from Christine Todd Whitman,
EPA Administrator, to the President of the United States on G-8 Meeting in Trieste (Mar. 6,
2001), https://perma.cc/YCX3-32PQ. Whitman recalls writing her memo on the plane home. See
WHITMAN, supra note 206, at 173. But before she even boarded the plane, the effort had been
launched to get Bush to reverse his position. See id. at 173–75 (explaining she learned upon her
return that there had been internal White House meetings on whether to reverse the president’s
commitment to regulate carbon, which was supported by the Office of the Vice President and the
Secretaries of Energy and Commerce, and that they planned to use the California energy crisis to
justify the reversal).
218. See, e.g., RON SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY: GEORGE W. BUSH, THE WHITE
HOUSE, AND THE EDUCATION OF PAUL O’NEILL 120, 124–25 (2004) (“Still, there was the
question of who had called the shot. Whitman and O’Neill Swiftly arrived at the same place: Dick
Cheney.”).
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protocol.219 The letter cited the California energy crisis, uncertainty
over climate science, and potential harm to the U.S. economy as
reasons for the reversals.220 It also declared that carbon dioxide is not
a pollutant,221 a declaration clearly aimed at preempting EPA from
regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.
The president’s abrupt policy reversal blindsided and embarrassed
Whitman and led Secretary of State Colin Powell to dub her the
administration’s “wind dummy” on climate policy. “It’s a military term
for when you are over the landing zone and you don’t know what the
winds are,” Whitman explained. “You push the dummy out the door
and see what happens to it.”222 Whitman had taken Bush’s campaign
commitments seriously and leaned into them. The backlash was severe.
This was March 2001. The Cheney Energy Task Force Report
came out soon after, in May.223 The report included proposals to
support nuclear power, invoked the need for energy conservation and
energy efficiency,224 and advocated for tax incentives to promote
investment in renewable energy. But it also underscored that
renewable energy sources were a fraction of supply and could not come
close to meeting the nation’s energy needs.225 The report’s main thrust
was to advocate for more domestic fossil energy production and
exploration, which would require removing existing regulatory
hurdles, streamlining review processes, and building new energy
219. President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change, Office of the White House Press
Secretary (June 11, 2001), https://perma.cc/TC7Q-YFTX; see also PETER BAKER, DAYS OF FIRE:
BUSH AND CHENEY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 589 (2013) (referring to “a letter Cheney had him
sign” to reverse the President’s campaign position on climate change and withdraw from Kyoto)
[hereinafter BAKER].
220. Connaughton Interview, supra note 208 (“The Clinton folks hadn’t sent it to Congress.
Even Al Gore couldn’t get this done. Why should we stick our necks out on this? The Kyoto
protocol didn’t make sense and needed rethinking.”).
221. See generally President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change, Office of the White
House Press Secretary (June 11, 2001), https://perma.cc/TC7Q-YFTX (distinguishing carbon
dioxide from other pollutants).
222. Gregg Easterbook, Hostile Environment, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 19, 2001),
https://perma.cc/XS9C-E28G (“That’s what Colin Powell has been calling me at cabinet meetings,
the wind dummy.”).
223. NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, WHITE HOUSE, RELIABLE,
AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2001),
https://perma.cc/M64V-UBMV.
224. Id. at xi-xv (detailing many proposals in the plan that sought to promote conservation
and energy efficiency); Telephone Interview with Andrew Lundquist, Former Executive
Director, National Energy Policy Group (April 29, 2019) (“The goal was to remove market
barriers to entry for energy production, not just for oil, natural gas, coal and nuclear, but also for
renewable resources and energy efficiency.”).
225. Id. at x.
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infrastructure to eliminate what the report framed as market and
regulatory barriers to greater supply.226 Thus, the unmistakable
message from the cumulative actions of the first few months of the
Bush administration was that fossil energy production would be
preeminent, and there would be no effort to mandate reductions in
greenhouse gases.227 The Cheney task force on energy had run over the
Rice task force on climate change. And EPA, which had enjoyed a
brief ascendance, expecting to implement a new cap-and-trade scheme
for carbon, retreated to focus on other things.
At the same time, Bush’s formal rejection of the Kyoto Protocol
sent a strong message internationally. While it is true that the Clinton
administration did not submit the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for
ratification, White House and State Department officials had been
committed to international climate negotiations and believed that the
treaty could be improved upon over time. Bush’s action was an
aggressive rebuke of that view, and a direct provocation to the
international community. It suggested that the U.S. simply did not care
about the issue.228 In contrast to Clinton and Gore (and to an earlier
version of himself), Bush grew increasingly disdainful of climate
change. He openly dismissed scientific reports,229 and allowed White
House officials to rewrite agency documents to downplay the risks and

226. See id. at 1-1 (“Our national energy policy must be comprehensive in scope. It must
protect our environment. It must also increase our supply of domestic oil, natural gas, coal”).
Among other things, the Report cited the California energy crisis, which had caused electricity
prices to spike, as evidence that barriers to supply needed to be removed. But the events in
California had multiple causes – including poor market design in California’s effort to deregulate
the electricity sector, and market manipulation by firms like Enron to create artificial shortages.
See Christopher Weare, The California Energy Crisis: Causes and Policy Options, Public Policy
Institute of California (2003), https://perma.cc/XG29-4UEV (“No single factor can fully account
for the crisis. The fault cannot be pinned entirely on the shortage in generating capacity. The
worst of the crisis occurred during the winter of 2000–2001, when demand was low and plenty of
capacity should have been available.)
227. Going forward, the administration would remove obstacles to supply, while supporting
modest improvements in energy efficiency, along with voluntary measures to reduce greenhouse
gases. See Spencer Abraham, The Bush Administration’s Approach to Climate Change, 305
SCIENCE 616, 616–17 (2004) (noting the Administration’s focus on market- and innovation-based
policies).
228. WHITMAN, supra note 206, at 181 (“There’s no doubt . . . that in foreign capitals—and
around dinner tables in Britain, France, and Germany—people resented what they saw as our
ready willingness to dismiss their concerns about the future of the planet and their economic
futures in favor of our own.”).
229. Lloyd Bries, Bush Disses Global Warming Report, CBS NEWS (June 3, 2002),
https://perma.cc/H3UM-LYE3.
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emphasize the uncertainties of climate change.230 Whitman and her
staff at EPA did their best to defend against this kind of meddling. She
once opted to delete an entire section on global warming from an EPA
report rather than accept major revisions that would have misstated the
science.231
Whitman remained at EPA for two–and–a half years, overseeing
the agency’s response to the events of September 11, 2001, supporting
and building on EPA’s voluntary greenhouse gas reduction programs,
and pushing back against administration efforts to weaken pollution
rules for power plants.232 However, her credibility and stature within
the administration were badly diminished by the events surrounding
the president’s about-face on climate policy. She left in mid-2003 to
spend more time with her family.233
B. Renouncing Legal Authority over CO2 and Massachusetts v.
EPA
Soon after Whitman’s departure, the new Acting EPA
Administrator renounced the Cannon memo from the Clinton era,
officially rejecting the view that greenhouse gases are “pollutants”
under the Clean Air Act, which aligned EPA’s legal position with
President Bush’s stated view.234 In addition, after letting it languish for
nearly three years, EPA finally denied the ICTA petition, declining to
make an endangerment determination for greenhouse gases from new
230. See e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Softened Greenhouse Gas Links to Global
Warming, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2005), https://perma.cc/AF3F-K4BT; Jeremy Symons, How Bush
and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST (July 13, 2003), https://perma.cc/K36X-JLNS; see also
Frontline Hot Politics, supra note 212 (recounting Council on Environmental Quality demands
to alter the wording of reports).
231. Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seeyle, Report by E.P.A. Leaves out Data on Climate
Change, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2003), https://perma.cc/5EEA-XATK. White House officials
objected to the Report linking a significant rise in global temperatures to human activity and
wanted to delete a reference to a National Academy of Sciences Report. EPA staff concluded
that to accept the changes would expose the agency to “severe criticism from the science and
environmental communities for poorly representing the science.” Whitman dropped it entirely.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ISSUE PAPER: WHITE HOUSE EDITS TO CLIMATE
CHANGE SECTION OF EPA’S REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT (Apr. 29, 2003), published in
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING 34–38 (2004).
232. See Gregg Easterbrook, Christie Todd Whitman May Have the Most Thankless Job in
Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2001), https://perma.cc/X6G2-WXER (outlining Whitman’s
career at the EPA).
233. David Stout, E.P.A. Chief Whitman Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2003),
https://perma.cc/32A8-P9BW.
234. See Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L.
Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator (Aug. 28, 2003) (determining that the EPA does not possess
authority to regulate “for global climate change purposes” under the Clean Air Act).
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vehicles.235 Indeed, EPA made clear that it would not regulate
greenhouse gases even if they were pollutants. The agency “disagree[d]
with the regulatory approach urged by petitioners” for several reasons:
“the science of climate change is extraordinarily complex and still
evolving”; regulation under Section 202 would be an inefficient and
piecemeal approach to the climate change issue; and unilateral EPA
regulation could “weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing
countries to reduce the GHG intensity of their economies.”236
To support its conclusion that the science was too uncertain to
warrant regulation, EPA relied on selective and somewhat misleading
excerpts from a 2001 report by the National Research Council that
emphasized uncertainty while downplaying many statements of
certainty or near-certainty that cut against EPA’s position.237 The
agency also referred to the President’s “comprehensive” global climate
change policy, which sought to encourage voluntary emissions
reductions and promote technology development and further scientific
research to reduce remaining uncertainties.238 This all fell in line with
the president’s decision not to pursue a cap on utility sector carbon
dioxide, made early in the administration: there would be no
mandatory limits on greenhouse gases. They were not pollutants.
In retrospect, denying the petition was a tactical mistake. It
converted agency “inaction,” which is typically difficult to challenge in
court, into agency “action,” which courts routinely review.239 EPA
easily could have reversed the Cannon memo to disclaim legal
authority and left it at that. But Jeff Holmstead, the Assistant
Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation, argued that the
agency ought to “make its position clear that EPA did not have this

235. EPA, Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003).
236. Id. at 52,922, 52,929–31.
237. Id at 52,930; see generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS (2001). For example, critics pointed out, the
agency omitted the opening line of the Report, which reads: “Greenhouse gases are accumulating
in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and
subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.” Id. at 1; see Brief of Climate Scientists David Battisti, et
al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)
(No. 05-112) (pointing out EPA’s mishandling of NAS Report and disregard of weight of
evidence).
238. EPA, Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003).
239. See RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER, JACK M. BEERMANN & JODY FREEMAN,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 248-9 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the difference
between inaction and action for purposes of judicial review).
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authority.”240 Denying the petition spurred a coalition of plaintiffs,
including several states, cities, and environmental and public health
organizations, to join the original petitioners in the case that would
become Massachusetts v. EPA.241
The history of this litigation has been comprehensively and
compellingly recounted by others, and there is no space to do it justice
here.242 It was a somewhat risky case to bring to the Supreme Court for
a variety of reasons, including the high bar plaintiffs must clear to show
their legal standing to sue, which is harder when the harm alleged is
widespread. 243 In addition, plaintiffs would need to overcome the
principle known as Chevron deference—named for the case in which it
was announced—which instructs courts to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statute, as long as the interpretation is
reasonable, which could weigh in favor of EPA’s narrow view of
“pollutant.”244 Another problem was that a few years earlier, in FDA
v. Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court had rules that the Food
and Drug Administration could not regulate nicotine as a “drug”
because agencies may not assert new, expansive regulatory authority
over matters of high political and economic salience without express
congressional authorization.245 Both Chevron and Brown & Williamson
seemed to pull against the petitioners and in favor of EPA.246 Finally,
it was hard to predict how the Court would view EPA’s argument that
even if greenhouse gases were pollutants, the agency could, for policy
reasons, lawfully decline to make the endangerment finding. Perhaps a
majority would treat that decision—a decision not to regulate—as
discretionary and defer.
240. Telephone Interview with Jeff Holmstead, Former Assistant Administrator for the
Office of Air and Radiation, EPA (Apr. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Holmstead Interview].
241. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 51–52 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)
(describing the purpose of the suit). The Petition for Review was first filed on October 23, 2003,
little more than a month after EPA denied the rulemaking petition. See Petition for Review,
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1361). “The plan was to let the states
appeal first, and then everyone joined.” Mendelson Interview, supra note 196.
242. See generally LAZARUS, supra note 193.
243. See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENVTL. L. 1, 5–6 (2008)
(describing the risks); see also Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 51–60 (2007) (explaining each element of the standing
test: that the injury be actual or imminent, not speculative; “fairly traceable” to the challenged
government action; and likely to be redressed if the plaintiff wins, is hard to demonstrate with an
incremental, cumulative and global phenomenon like climate change).
244. Cf. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 243, at 53, 84–85 (discussing the majority opinion).
245. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (outlining court’s
rationale behind this decision).
246. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 243, at 51–60 (explaining the legacy of both cases).
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As a result, the outcome of Massachusetts v. EPA was far from a
foregone conclusion, and its importance is hard to overstate. By a
narrow 5-4 margin, the Supreme Court did three amazing things: grant
standing to a state petitioner complaining that a federal agency’s
failure to act on climate change was unlawful; hold that greenhouse
gases are pollutants subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act; and
reject each of the Bush administration’s reasons for refusing to decide
on endangerment.247 Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court also helped
to legitimize the scientific consensus on climate change at a time when
the Bush administration had undermined it. Legally and symbolically,
Massachusetts v. EPA was the biggest win for the environmental
movement ever. The Court’s decision also thrust EPA into the leading
role on national climate policy, positioning the agency to act, if an
administration were ever inclined to regulate greenhouse gases.
C. Responding to the Court
By the time Massachusetts v. EPA was decided, Stephen Johnson
had become EPA Administrator after the short tenure of former Utah
Governor Mike Leavitt. Leavitt had earned considerable praise for
being highly effective administrator but had focused on things other
than climate.248 Johnson lacked the political acumen of Leavitt and did
not have the stature of other prior administrators, but he was in step
with the White House, which considered him to be a “loyal soldier.”249
While Massachusetts v. EPA was pending, agency lawyers in the
General Counsel’s Office and the Air and Radiation Office had been
“working on a Plan B” in case EPA lost. They considered, for example,
adding carbon dioxide to the administration’s plan to regulate mercury
247. See id. (explaining the significance of the decision).
248. Leavitt was well-liked and respected, and he worked the halls of the White House to
garner support for his agency. He was “the most impressive executive I have ever worked for,”
said Jeff Holmstead. Holmstead Interview, supra note 240240. But Leavitt could read the politics
on climate change. “It was clear that they wanted to deal with climate in the White House, and it
was mostly dealt with by Connaughton out of CEQ. I did my best to manage what was happening
in agency. There were lots of other things to occupy my time and interest, and that was just fine.”
Telephone Interview with Michael Leavitt, Former EPA Administrator (July 15, 2019). About
the prospect of regulating CO2, Leavitt also remarked, “It was not ripe for governance. People
were on all sides of it. It started to ripen more in the second term, but this was the first term when
they were positioning for reelection and needed coal country.” Id.
249. See John Shiffman & John Sullivan, An Eroding Mission at EPA, PHIL. INQUIRER (Dec.
2, 2008), https://perma.cc/Y2ZM-TLU8 (“It’s sad to see,” said former New Jersey Gov. Christine
Todd Whitman, who resigned in 2003 as Bush’s first EPA administrator after repeated clashes
with the White House. “It’s a good agency, and there’s a lot of good people there who will help
you as long as they think you want to move forward. But if they think you’re not serious about
protecting the environment, they’ll turn on you.”).

freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete)

46

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/11/2021 10:53 AM

[Vol. XXXI:1

pollution using a cap-and-trade approach.250 That possibility
evaporated, however, when the Supreme Court struck down the
mercury proposal.251 The White House was split over how to respond.
Jim Connaughton, the CEQ chair, argued for turning lemons into
lemonade, by issuing the endangerment finding during Bush’s final
months, and taking credit for moving forward on climate change.252
Connaughton reasoned that doing so could help the president deliver
on something he had said in his 2006 State of the Union speech, when
he declared that “America is addicted to oil,” and called for the country
to “break this addiction.”253 Connaughton won—sort of. The White
House instructed EPA to take only the first step: prepare an Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on the endangerment
finding, soliciting comments on how to respond to the Supreme Court
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.254
Alas, Johnson would become the second EPA wind dummy of the
Bush administration. EPA staff worked for months on the massive
rulemaking package, conducting a thorough assessment of the climate
science, and concluding, unequivocally, that the record supported a
finding that greenhouse gases endanger human health and welfare.255
But when Johnson sent the draft Advanced Notice to the White House
for regulatory review, the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, knowing generally what it contained and aware that accepting
it would make it a public document, initially refused to open it. OIRA
eventually did accept the email but only to request that EPA
“withdraw” it from formal regulatory review. 256 Susan Dudley, the
OIRA director, returned it to EPA with a letter waiving the normal
review process and stating that, “the staff draft cannot be considered
administration policy or representative of the views of the
administration.”257 Jason Burnett, the young Associate Deputy

250. Connaughton Interview, supra note 208.
251. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (striking down EPA’s proposal
to delist mercury as a hazardous air pollutant and regulate it using a cap-and-trade approach
under Clean Air Act 111(d)).
252. Connaughton Interview, supra note 208; Holmstead Interview, supra note 240.
253. George W. Bush, President of the United States, The State of the Union Address by the
President of the United States (Jan. 31, 2006).
254. Connaughton Interview, supra note 208.
255. Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 249.
256. Id.
257. See Letter from Susan Dudley, Administrator, OIRA, to Stephen L. Johnson,
Administrator, EPA (July 10, 2008), https://perma.cc/28TH-JUBW (noting that due to an
inability to reach consensus during inter-agency review, the draft ANPRM does not represent
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Administrator who had overseen the Advance Notice process at EPA,
resigned in protest.258
Johnson had the legal power to issue the Notice as written, but he
bent to the White House and issued a drastically different revised
version. The new draft omitted the statement that lingering doubts
about climate change were irrelevant in the face of the overwhelming
evidence, and it no longer proposed to make the endangerment
finding. Now, the regulatory package began with the EPA
administrator disavowing his own agency’s work,259 followed by several
letters—from the Director of OMB, the Chairs of the National
Economic Council and the Council on Environmental Quality, and the
heads of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy and
Transportation—all saying that, regardless of the science, and despite
the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Clean Air
Act was “fundamentally unsuited” for reducing greenhouse gases.260
The press declared this turn of events “the low-water mark of a
tumultuous era that has left the EPA badly wounded, largely
demoralized and, in many ways, emasculated.”261 Johnson, the only
career scientist ever to lead EPA, was reportedly “upset and disgusted”
to have been put in that position.262
While George W. Bush deserves credit for backing legislation to
raise energy efficiency and fuel efficiency standards,263 his
administration policy; EPA would withdraw it from review and OIRA would waive review under
Exec. Order No. 12866).
258. See Felicity Barringer, A New (and Unlikely) Tell-All, NY TIMES (July 22, 2008),
https://perma.cc/HVV3-Z7DG (underscoring the idea that Burnett was a former employee).
259. The “Preface from the Administrator” said that the Clean Air Act is ill-suited for
regulating GHGs and that none of the views in the Notice represented agency decisions or
recommendations. EPA, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. 44,354, 44,354–55 (July 30, 2008). Johnson had “brought the program offices together and
said we would do an ANPRM, maybe we can use the Clean Air Act to regulate GHGs. . . And
the staff believed him. He gave them 6 months and they worked so hard to think through all the
elements of the Act. People could not go on vacation, worked around the clock, no vacations.
When he brought them to his office to tell them what he did, they thought it was most depressing
thing he could have done. They were all disgusted. Especially as former career person he
dishonored the agency and his people. He should have resigned.” Telephone Interview with
Margo Oge, former Office Director, Office of Transportation and Air Quality (Nov. 20, 2020).
260. Dudley, supra note 257.
261. Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 249.
262. Holmstead Interview, supra note 240. “What happened to Johnson was what happened
to Whitman – he was sent on an errand by people in the White House that hadn’t anticipated the
pressure they’d come under. The rug got pulled out from under him.” Id. Administrator Johnson
did not respond to several emails requesting an interview.
263. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492
(2007) (creating higher energy efficiency and fuel efficiency standards).
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administration did more to set back climate policy than advance it. His
time in office was bookended by two consequential decisions to block
EPA: early on, by withdrawing his support for a bill that would have
authorized EPA to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants, and at
the end of his tenure, by repudiating the endangerment finding for
greenhouse gases. Before leaving office, President Bush gave a speech
in which he argued there was a “wrong way and a right way” for
Congress to approach climate legislation.264 The speech was intended
to signal his support for “market-based” regulation of greenhouse
gases, such as through a cap-and-trade approach.265 But the speech was
inscrutable.266 Cheney’s office had muddled the language so badly that
no one could tell what the president was proposing.267
V. The Obama Administration: EPA Unleashed
A. Hope and Change
By the time Barack Obama clinched the Democratic nomination
for president in 2008, the states had become the driving force of U.S.
climate policy. For example, in 2002, California directed its Air
Resources Board to set greenhouse gas emission standards for new cars
and trucks—the nation’s first.268 Seven states signed a memorandum of
understanding in 2005 to reduce CO2 emissions in the northeast and
mid-Atlantic region, an agreement that would evolve into the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative.269 In 2006, California set an ambitious
target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.270 Other states began
experimenting with a variety of renewable energy, energy efficiency,
264. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address on Climate Change and the
Environment at the White House Rose Garden (Aug. 16, 2008), https://perma.cc/9R87-LLHU.
265. Id. (“The right way is to promote more emission-free nuclear power and encourage the
investments necessary to produce electricity from coal without releasing carbon into the air . . .
the incentive should be technology neutral . . . the incentive should be long-lasting. It should
provide a positive and reliable market signal . . . the incentive should be carbon-weighted to make
lower emission power sources less expensive relative to higher emissions sources.”).
266. James Connaughton recalls drafting the speech and regrets that it was not more specific
in mentioning cap-and-trade. Connaughton Interview, supra note 208.
267. Late in his second term, Bush had authorized a small team of close advisors to develop
a climate policy that would cap electricity-sector emissions—the very policy he had jettisoned at
the start of his administration. BAKER, supra note 219, at 589–90.
268. A.B. 1493, 2001–2002 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 200 (codified as amended at
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a)).
269. A brief history of RGCI, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (2020),
https://perma.cc/6K8C-BXW7.
270. See The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 38501 et seq. (establishing a state-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system and setting targets).
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and emissions reduction policies.271 Climate change had also, by this
time, entered the courts. States, cities, and other plaintiffs were suing
the major electric utility companies, oil companies, and auto
manufacturers for their contributions to the harms caused by global
warming.272
During the campaign, both Obama and McCain made climate
change one of their top issues and pledged support for greenhouse gas
regulation.273 In particular, Obama promised to reconsider the
endangerment finding for greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act,
which Bush’s EPA had refused to make, and revisit EPA’s refusal to
issue California a preemption waiver to set its own standards for
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions.274
In his speech claiming victory in the primary as well as in his
inaugural address, Obama spoke of climate change with a sense of
urgency and obligation to future generations.275 He also tapped Carol
Browner, Clinton’s former EPA chief, to lead a new White House
Office of Energy and Climate Change.276 It seemed that, along with
health care and a stimulus plan to boost the battered economy, climate
change would be a top legislative priority. It would be difficult to get a
climate bill through Congress, though, even with both Chambers under
Democratic control. During negotiations over the bill, the
administration used EPA as a threat: if Congress did not pass new
legislation, the agency would be forced to regulate using the Clean Air
Act.277 Everyone knew that the Clean Air Act did not lend itself to

271. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1525 (2007) (describing state initiatives to regulate
GHGs).
272. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Comer
v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007); People of State of
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
273. Andrew C. Revkin, On Global Warming, McCain and Obama Agree: Urgent Action Is
Needed, NY TIMES (Oct. 19, 2008), https://perma.cc/67W2-D9N8. McCain had co-sponsored a
bipartisan climate bill in Congress known as the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act of
2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003).
274. See id. (describing the environmental promises made by the candidates).
275. See, e.g., Barack Hussein Obama, Address in St. Paul upon winning Democratic Party
primary (June 3, 2008); Barack Hussein Obama, President of the United States, Inaugural
Presidential Address (Jan. 21, 2009).
276. Carol E. Lee, Carol Browner, POLITICO (Dec. 03, 2009, 11:59 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/12/carol-browner-030061. This was not entirely positive.
Jackson hadn’t known about Browner’s appointment when she accepted the EPA job, and it
limited her influence to have climate policy led from the White House.
277. See Barack Hussein Obama, President of the United States, The State of the Union
Address by the President of the United States, 1 Pub. Papers 97 (Feb. 12, 2013) (“But if Congress

freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete)

50

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/11/2021 10:53 AM

[Vol. XXXI:1

optimal, cost-effective regulation because it did not expressly allow
EPA to implement an economy-wide emissions trading scheme. Surely
Congress would rather pass a fresh and comprehensive approach.
The prospect of a new climate bill caused some anxiety at EPA.
By this time, agency career staff felt strong ownership of the climate
issue. The Supreme Court had ratified the agency’s regulatory
authority, and the Office of Air and Radiation had done a huge amount
of work preparing a greenhouse gas endangerment finding, only to see
it blocked by the Bush White House. EPA staff were eager to rectify
that debacle and move forward with setting standards. And while new
climate legislation would be exciting, EPA’s role remained uncertain.
Congress might authorize EPA to implement an economy-wide
emissions trading regime, but it might give DOE, Treasury, or other
agencies a prominent role.278 There was also concern that Congress
might preempt EPA’s regulatory authority as part of the deal. Many
EPA officials argued for retaining the agency’s regulatory authority as
a backstop, in case the cap and trade scheme being negotiated did not
reduce emissions sufficiently—what some called a “belt and
suspenders” approach. It did not help matters that the president’s
political strategy on climate change was being driven by the White
House, without as much EPA involvement as top agency officials
would have liked. Carol Browner’s role as “climate czar” could not
help but diminish the influence of Lisa Jackson and her team at EPA.
The House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy
and Security Act on a partisan vote in June 2009.279 The bill established
an economy-wide cap on greenhouse gases to reduce emissions 20%
below 2005 levels by 2020 (with stringency increasing over time);280 a
won’t act soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct my cabinet to come up with
executive actions we can take, now and in the future. . . .”); Amanda Little, EPA chief Lisa
Jackson on mountaintop removal, climate legislation, toxics, and more, GRIST (June 24, 2009),
https://perma.cc/MS3S-TSP6 (“I would like to see new legislation. The president has called for
new energy and climate legislation. It’s extremely important for our country. . . That being said, I
thought it was a solemn responsibility that I had as administrator of the EPA to follow the law. . .
[a]nd certainly if we find that greenhouse gases endanger public health and welfare, that requires
EPA to act from a regulatory standpoint.”).
278. “Some would call it territorialism but if you’ve been in trenches fighting and feeling
alone and now climate is one of new president’s signature issues, you react like ‘welcome to party’
and it’s frustrating to see that a new bill might send things over to DOE to implement; EPA worry
that they would lose turf. But at the time, the agency was in good place to support any legislation
from analysis and modeling perspective.” Telephone Interview with Former Senior
Administration Official.
279. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)
(passing the U.S. House of Representatives on a vote of 219-212).
280. Id. at Section 311, 702.
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clean energy standard requiring electric utilities to meet 20% of
electricity demand through renewable sources by 2020;281 and a variety
of investments in clean technologies.282 Yet, after Henry Waxman and
his staff shepherded the bill through the House, painstakingly working
through allowance allocation formulas, and other complicated design
issues to solve member concerns, and after Nancy Pelosi skillfully
whipped the votes, Democratic leaders in the Senate were never able
to put together a credible legislative package.283 The bill was dead by
the spring of 2010.
There was plenty of blame to go around for this failure, and the
White House got the lion’s share: the president had spent too much
political capital on health care, and that bill had taken too long;284 the
White House never sent a draft climate bill, or even draft principles, to
the Hill—a sharp contrast to what the first Bush administration had
done to get the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments passed;285 the
administration inexplicably gave away a number of concessions, like
opening up offshore drilling and providing loan guarantees for nuclear
power, without linking them to a legislative deal;286 Carol Browner was
the wrong messenger to the Hill and lacked influence in the West Wing;
the Chief of Staff and other senior White House officials did not have
the same fire in the belly on climate change that they had for health
care; and so on.287
But it wasn’t all the White House’s fault. Environmental groups
had failed to deliver on a promised advertising blitz to reward members
of the House who had taken a hard vote for the bill. The members had
gotten pummeled back in their districts, which left Pelosi furious, and
sent the wrong message to Democratic Senators, who would also need

281. Id. at Section 101, 103.
282. See generally id. at Title I.
283. See David Robert, Why Did The Climate Bill Fail?, GRIST (July 27, 2010),
https://perma.cc/8FW7-P8YL.
284. See, e.g., Randy Rieland, The Blame Obama Game, GRIST (July 27, 2010),
https://perma.cc/4TRU-7SMM (collecting a variety of articles that blamed President Obama);
Tim Dickinson, Climate Bill, R.I.P., ROLLING STONE (July 21, 2010, 12:15 PM),
https://perma.cc/4ZN9-3C44; Darren Samuelsohn, Battle Over Health Care Leaves ‘Blood in the
Water’ for Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2009), https://perma.cc/QY5Q-RACL.
285. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 11,
2010), https://perma.cc/79D4-AQMN; Editorial Board, With a Whimper, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2010), https://perma.cc/8SU6-W4UE.
286. See, e.g., Robert, supra note 283; Lee Wasserman, Four Ways to Kill a Climate Bill, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 2010) https://perma.cc/HZ5K-Y64M.
287. See Lizza, supra note 285 (analyzing reasons the bill failed to pass).
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political cover to vote for a climate bill.288 Barbara Boxer, who chaired
the Senate committee with jurisdiction over the bill, lacked a process
for knitting together the necessary support, and her staff did not
manage the bill well.289 And the cap and trade approach to CO2
emissions reductions at the heart of the House bill was an easy target
for Republicans, who attacked it as a “cap and tax” scheme (ironic,
since the emissions trading idea originally came from Republicans).290
Nor did it help, after the 2008 financial crisis, that a market-based plan
with emissions “allowances” and complex trading rules sounded like
something the financial industry could game.291 When Boxer’s bill
failed to materialize, John Kerry, Lindsay Graham, and Joe Lieberman
tried to piece an alternative together, but they too failed.292 The result
was no climate bill—which meant falling back on the Clean Air Act,
and EPA.
B. Leveraging the Clean Air Act
Even before Waxman-Markey failed to pass, the administration
was working on another track: using executive power to make progress
on climate change. This strategy would rely heavily on EPA, since it
could utilize the Clean Air Act—the most potent regulatory tool for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation, electricity,
manufacturing and industrial sectors of the economy. In the first few
months of 2009, the White House Office of Energy and Climate change
had quietly led a process to set the first federal greenhouse gas
standards for new cars and light trucks, delivering on the promise of
Massachusetts v. EPA, the case in which environmental plaintiffs had

288. See Kate Sheppard, Conservative activists wage war on Republicans who voted for
climate bill, GRIST (July 2, 2009), https://perma.cc/3NKZ-RCJS (describing opposition to the bill);
see Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill Effort, N.Y. TIMES
(July 22, 2010), https://perma.cc/9NU4-8X4R (noting Pelosi’s response to the bill’s failure).
289. Lisa Lerer & Manu Raju, Dems raise concerns about Boxer, POLITICO (July 23, 2009
4:13 AM), https://perma.cc/V75Y-JP6M; Darren Samuelsohn, Boxer Loses Key Committee
Staffer, Cap-And-Trade Expert, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2009), https://perma.cc/U3HN-AYGE.
290. See John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy of Choice,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2010), https://perma.cc/6G9S-7GFA (noting the Tea Party’.s use of cap and
trade as an example of everything “wrong with Washington”).
291. Margaret Kriz, Financial Crisis Dims Chances for U.S. Climate Legislation, YALE ENV’T
360 (Oct. 6, 2008), https://perma.cc/RP5C-F4JA.
292. Keith Johnson, Climate Bill: Kerry, Graham and Lieberman’s Compromise Plan, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2009), https://perma.cc/G87Q-VUCB; Eric de Place, Kerry-Lieberman climate bill:
The details, GRIST (May 14, 2010), https://perma.cc/N33D-DW7A; Alexander Bolton, Liberal
activists say good riddance to Kerry-Lieberman climate legislation, THE HILL (July 24, 2010 11:09
PM), https://perma.cc/94GG-CREE.
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petitioned the agency to set precisely these standards.293 The plan was
for EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
which sets Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards,294 to issue the
rules jointly, in something of a grand bargain: the harmonized federal
standards would require auto companies to make improvements in fuel
efficiency of about 5% annually through 2016. In exchange, compliance
would be greatly simplified.295 While California would be granted a
preemption waiver to set its own vehicle greenhouse gas standards—
preserving its formal legal authority to do so, as Obama had suggested
he would do—California would agree to treat compliance with the
federal standards as compliance with the state’s standards, since a
national approach would produce greater emissions reductions
overall.296 All of the states that had opted into California’s vehicle
greenhouse gas standards would follow California’s lead. In exchange
for the certainty and predictability of this single national regime, the
auto industry would agree to not challenge the new rules in court and
drop their pending preemption challenges against California.297 And all

293. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the
“Car Deal”, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 344 (2011).
294. See Energy and Independence Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492
(2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 49 U.S.C.) (providing EPA with
CLEAN AIR ACT authority to regulate mobile sources of emissions); Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 and 49 U.S.C.) (providing NHTSA with authority to set fleetwide average
fuel economy standards).
295. Freeman, supra note 293, at 344–46.
296. It was in California’s interest to agree, since the cumulative emissions reductions would
exceed what could be accomplished by California and the states that would opt-in to California’s
standards on their own. Id.
297. The same framework would be used in 2012 to set another round of standards covering
2016-2025. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Obama Administration Finalizes Historic
54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards (Aug. 28, 2012), https://perma.cc/E9CE-JJN2; 2017; see Later
Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (finalizing the announced rule). All told
the standards were projected to double fuel efficiency to 54.5 mpg by 2025, save consumers
trillions in gasoline costs, and save the country billions of barrels in imported oil. See Jody
Freeman, The Auto Rule Rollback That Nobody Wants, Except Trump, NY TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://perma.cc/JMM7-QYZW (describing the benefits of the deal); White House Office of the
Press Secretary, Obama Administration Finalizes Historic 54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards
(Aug. 28, 2012), https://perma.cc/E9CE-JJN2. The administration would also use the same
approach to strengthen standards for medium and heavy-duty trucks. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76
Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011).
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of this would be accomplished through “letters of commitment” that
each company would make directly to the agency heads.298
It is tempting to believe that the auto companies were forced to
agree to the new standards as a condition of the Obama
administration’s financial rescue of the industry. At the time, two of
the Big Three U.S. companies, GM and Chrysler, were at risk of
collapse and had received bailout funds from the government.299 But
Ford had not. And the agreement, with all of its component parts—
which required every company, agency, and state involved to take
action on faith that another participant would deliver on their
promises—was not a foregone conclusion by any stretch. Indeed, the
auto industry might have adopted a united front, and argued that, given
the economic headwinds, this was not the time to strengthen
regulations. But they did not. The advantages of a single national
standard and the prospect of at least a temporary truce in the legendary
battles over fuel economy standards prevailed. The agreement was
announced in a Rose Garden ceremony in May of 2009.300
EPA’s role in what came to be known as the Car Deal was
extremely impressive. Agency career staff in the Office of
Transportation and Air Quality, including experts from the agency’s
state-of-the-art “car lab” in Michigan,301 worked tirelessly under huge
pressure to model the impacts of the new standards; reconcile their
numbers with NHTSA’s own modeling; present their projections of
technology penetration, cost, and other impacts to various White
House officials; and respond to countless internal demands for more
data.302 It was a potent demonstration of the expertise housed within
the agency, and the eagerness of the career staff to act on climate
change.
At the same time, EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation was
thoroughly reviewing and updating the endangerment finding that had
been scuttled by the Bush administration, to ensure it reflected the
latest science, which was important to rank-and-file staff. In December
298. See EPA, 2011 Commitment Letters for 2017-2025 Light-Duty National
Program, https://perma.cc/J7H9-GX3L (listing the 16 letters received from companies for the
2017 to 2025 period).
299. Kimberly Amadeo, Auto Industry Bailout, THE BALANCE (June 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/34AW-LPGM.
300. See generally Barack Hussein Obama, Remarks on Fuel Efficiency Standards, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 672 (May 19, 2009).
301. See About the National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory (NVFEL), U.S. EPA,
https://perma.cc/26VQ-VJXM (describing the lab).
302. Freeman, supra note 293, at 344–46.
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2009, Lisa Jackson signed the decision making the endangerment
finding for greenhouse gases, determining it was warranted on the basis
of the overwhelming scientific consensus. This step provided a kind of
moral vindication for the agency and established the legal foundation
for the vehicle standards and other greenhouse gas rules, which were
to follow.303
Thus, within the first year, the Obama administration had shown
that it could successfully use the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from the transportation sector—the fastest growing
share of emissions in the U.S. economy. The administration proved to
Congress that it would act if the climate bill failed, and signaled to the
international community, in advance of the 2009 United Nations
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, that the U.S. was
committed to reducing domestic emissions.304
C. Dominoes
EPA’s endangerment finding, and its greenhouse gas standards
for cars and trucks, had tipped the first dominoes toward regulating
greenhouse gas pollution from stationary sources, like power plants
and refineries. Section 111 of the Clean Air Act directs EPA to develop
what are called New Source Performance Standards—standards for
new, modified, and reconstructed stationary sources of air pollution.305
EPA sets these standards for sources in industrial categories, that emit
pollution which EPA concludes poses an endangerment to public
health and welfare.306 It stands to reason that if greenhouse gases from
cars and trucks pose a danger to health and welfare, surely greenhouse
gases from stationary source categories, like powerplants, would too.
If so, EPA should require stationary sources to control their CO2
303. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (“The
Administrator finds that six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public
health and the public welfare of current and future generations.”).
304. The Copenhagen meeting was the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. President Obama attended the Copenhagen
meeting, and pledged the U.S. to achieve greenhouse gas emissions reductions “in the range of
17%” below 2005 levels by 2020, based on what the Waxman-Markey bill was projected to
achieve. See generally White House Office of the Press Secretary, Support for President’s
Copenhagen Announcement Receives Immediate Support (Nov. 25, 2009), https://perma.cc/63SXDSWS.
305. CLEAN AIR ACT § 111; 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012) (defining the term Standards
of Performance as emissions standards reflecting the amount of emission reduction achievable
through the use of the “Best System of Emissions Reduction”); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012)
(defining “standard of performance”).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).
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emissions, just as they must control their emissions of conventional
pollution. Indeed, states and environmentalists had already sued EPA
in 2006 for failing to include CO2 in their New Source Performance
Standards for powerplants. In 2010, the agency signed a consent decree
agreeing to do so.307
But EPA had a more immediate problem: what to do about the
prospect that tens of thousands of sources may be triggered into a fairly
small Clean Air Act program known as “prevention of significant
deterioration” (PSD), which is designed to limit air quality
deterioration in areas that meet or exceed the national ambient air
quality standards.308 For purposes of this program, the Act defines a
“major” source as emitting as few as 100 tons per year of “any air
pollutant.”309 Sources emitting amounts of pollution over the statutory
threshold must go through “new source review,” a process requiring
them to obtain permits and install the “best available control
technology”—not only for the pollutant that triggered them into the
program but for all pollutants regulated under the Act.310 And here is
where the complication arose: now that greenhouse gases were
“pollutants” subject to regulation under the Act (for which EPA had
set mobile source emission standards), did that mean thousands of
small sources producing as few as 100 tons per year of greenhouse gases
would require a permit to operate, conditioned on installing the best
available control technology? At the same time, how should EPA
handle the possibility that millions of very small sources emitting only
greenhouse gases but no other pollution might now need a Clean Air
Act operating permit for the first time because they met the Act’s
threshold definition of “major” source, which is having the potential to
emit 100 tons per year of “any pollutant.”311
These possibilities were so administratively unmanageable and
politically unappealing that EPA opted to administratively raise the
307. See New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (deciding state brought action to
compel EPA to place limits on carbon dioxide emissions from new electric power plants). For
background, see States Sue EPA (Again) Over Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions, MARTEN
LAW (May 17, 2006), https://perma.cc/F4J3-6N9G. The consent decrees, both issued on
December 21, 2010, covered two distinct categories of sources: boilers and refineries. See Nathan
Richardson, EPA Greenhouse Gas Performance Standards: What the Settlement Agreement
Means, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (Feb. 2011), https://perma.cc/8GUR-NGWR (describing
the consent decrees and their effects).
308. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (2012) (stating the purpose of the PSD program).
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (2012) (defining major emitting facility as having the potential to
emit 100 tons per year of “any” air pollutant).
310. CLEAN AIR ACT § 165(a)(1)–(4); 42 U.S.C. § 7476(a)(1)–(4) (2012).
311. Id.
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numerical threshold to 100,000 tons per year for greenhouse gases so
that only very large sources would be triggered into the PSD New
Source Review program and require an operating permit.312 To defend
this decision, EPA adopted a legal theory of “administrative
necessity,” saying that it was necessary to avoid absurd results that
Congress could never have intended.313
There were vigorous internal administration debates over the
wisdom of this strategy, with some officials arguing that EPA should
avoid the legal fight entirely and disclaim authority to regulate
greenhouse gases under the program, since it was unlikely to yield
substantial incremental emissions reductions anyway. Others argued in
the opposite direction, that EPA should not even raise the threshold
and instead take the position that it planned to issue millions of new
permits but would phase them in over time. How to manage this
problem, and with what legal theory, was a major preoccupation of
both EPA and several White House officials for months, requiring
hours and hours of meetings.314 In the end, the agency raised the
numerical thresholds.315
When the Supreme Court rejected EPA’s approach as unlawful,316
it was, in the words of Gina McCarthy, then Assistant Administrator
for Air and Radiation, “the best decision I ever lost.”317 The Court
spared EPA the headache of regulating millions of new sources by
reading “any pollutant” in the definition of major source to exclude
312. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010).
313. See Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 312 (2014) (“Those steps were necessary,
[EPA] said, because the PSD program and Title V were designed to regulate ‘a relatively small
number of large industrial sources,’ and requiring permits for all sources with greenhouse-gas
emissions above the statutory thresholds would radically expand those programs, making them
both unadministrable and ‘unrecognizable to the Congress that designed’ them.”).
314. As a Deputy in the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change, the author
participated in these debates.
315. “After years of implementing the PSD program to pollutants other than the six national
ambient air quality standards, however, and after Massachusetts v. EPA had interpreted
‘pollutant’ to include greenhouse gases as a default matter, the agency was not going to
unilaterally disarm.” Telephone Interview with Joseph Goffman, Former Associate Assistant
Administrator for Climate and Senior Counsel in the Office of Air and Radiation, EPA (July 2,
2019) [hereinafter Goffman Interview].
316. Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 319–20, 323–25 (2014) (holding that
greenhouse gases are not an “air pollutant” for purposes of the PSD program, but that once a
source triggers into the program because it emits over the threshold amount of another pollutant,
the source must meet Best Available Control Technology for “any pollutant subject to regulation
under the Act,” including greenhouse gases).
317. Telephone Interview with Gina McCarthy, Former EPA Administrator (June 18, 2019)
[hereinafter McCarthy Interview].
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greenhouse gases. As a result, sources emitting greenhouse gases only
would not trigger into the program. As a practical matter, though, the
decision allowed EPA to regulate the overwhelming majority of
greenhouse gas emissions from the largest sources anyway. By a vote
of 7-2, the Supreme Court held that sources triggered into the program
because of their emissions of conventional pollution would need to
control all of their emissions, including greenhouse gases.318 Above all,
the Court had not reconsidered Massachusetts v. EPA or disturbed the
agency’s endangerment finding.
D. Next Step: The Clean Power Plan
By late 2010, however, the White House’s appetite for bold
regulatory action on greenhouse gases seemed to wane. The midterm
elections had flipped control of the House of Representatives to the
Republicans, who also gained seats in the Senate, in an electoral result
the president himself deemed a “shellacking.”319 Even before the
midterms, climate and energy politics were becoming more fraught.
The Deepwater Horizon rig had exploded in the Gulf of Mexico,
causing the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history320 and
prompting the president to impose a highly unpopular moratorium on
offshore drilling in states where his popularity already was not high.
The Department of the Interior then withdrew its recently
announced five-year offshore drilling plan, which had proposed to
open more areas to oil and gas leasing, in a bid to attract Republican
support for climate legislation. That position was no longer politically
defensible in the aftermath of the spill.321 By fall, after the 2010 midterm elections, the constituencies needed to support comprehensive
clean energy and climate legislation were pulling farther apart. The
White House began to turn its attention to re-election. EPA officials

318. Jody Freeman, Symposium: Soft Landings and Strategic Choices, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb.
5, 2014), https://perma.cc/VXF6-PALC. The Court held, by a vote of 7-2, that sources emitting
over the statutory threshold amount of conventional pollution (e.g., 100 or 250 tons depending on
the source) would be required to obtain a permit and control their emissions of all pollutants
regulated under the Act, including their greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g., Nina
Totenberg, EPA Gets A Win From Supreme Court On Global Warming Emissions — Mostly,
NPR (June 23, 2014 4:07 PM), https://perma.cc/JME7-W92T.
319. William Branigin, Obama Reflects on ‘shellacking’ in Midterm Elections, WASH. POST
(Nov. 3, 2010), https://perma.cc/ECX9-RBTU.
320. David Barstow, David Rohde & Stephanie Saul, Deepwater Horizon’s Final Hours, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 25, 2010), https://perma.cc/WSU5-2UMT.
321. Scott Neuman, Obama Ends Ban on East Coast Offshore Drilling, NPR (Mar. 31, 2010),
https://perma.cc/FG6B-NYKG; Bettina Boxall & Richard Simon, Obama Administration
Withdraws Offshore Drilling Plan, LA TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010), https://perma.cc/6QPD-TUWG.
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perceived that the White House’s appetite for additional greenhouse
gas regulation was waning.322
The agency did, however, move ahead with other air pollution
rules. For example, in 2011, after many years of delay, the agency
proposed the Mercury and Air Toxics rule to reduce hazardous air
pollutants from power plants.323 While not directly relevant to climate
policy, the rulemaking had some unexpected benefits for the agency’s
greenhouse gas agenda by creating an opportunity for EPA to work
closely with DOE, FERC, and regional managers of the nation’s
transmission grids.324 They modelled the rule’s impacts on the
electricity sector, and worked on implementation issues, and, “without
realizing it, they were building a political and intellectual infrastructure
that would be instrumental for the administration’s later effort to set
standards for CO2 from the electricity sector. EPA figured out that it
could spend time with DOE, FERC, and PJM [a regional transmission
organization], and find common language and jointly work to the
solution.”325 In March 2012, the agency also set standards for volatile
organic compounds (VOC) from oil and gas processing facilities,
requiring them to perform green completions.326 Again, the rule was
not directly focused on greenhouse gases, but reducing VOCs would
322. Goffman Interview, supra note 315; McCarthy Interview, supra note 317; Email
Communication from Robert Sussman, Former EPA Deputy Administrator (May 5, 2019) (on
file with author).
323. Mercury & Air Toxics Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976 (proposed May 3, 2011) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, 63). EPA had completed a public health study of mercury’s effects
in 1998 and concluded in 2000 that regulation of power plants was “appropriate and necessary.”
See Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,825–26 (Dec. 20, 2000) (finding “regulation of HAP
emissions from coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units under section 112 of the
CLEAN AIR ACT is appropriate and necessary”). However, in 2005, the George W. Bush
Administration sought to revoke this finding, delist mercury as an air toxin, and establish a capand-trade scheme to control its emission. This rule was struck down by the D.C. Circuit, leaving
the task of designing a replacement to the next administration. See generally New Jersey v. EPA,
517 F.3d 574, 580, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
324. Goffman Interview, supra note 315; see also, Jody Freeman, The Uncomfortable
Convergence of Energy and Environmental Law, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 404–05 (2017)
(describing the impact of the MATS process on the Clean Power Plan).
325. Goffman Interview, supra note 315. The MATS rule also helped to force hard decisions
about which among the older units industry ought to shut down, versus update. “That meant that
when we got the Clean Power Plan, the conversation was already happening and many of the hard
decisions had been made. All of this was possible because of fracking and cheap natural gas.”
McCarthy Interview, supra note 317.
326. “Green Completions” are systems designed to recover and process methane released
during natural gas production. EPA, Reduced Emission Completions (Green Completions)
(Aug. 30, 2005), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201709/documents/3_reduced_emission_completions.pdf.
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also reduce methane emissions—another collateral benefit for climate
policy.327
State and environmental petitioners, meanwhile, kept pressing
EPA to set standards for greenhouse gas emissions for the power
sector, as the agency had committed to do in the 2010 settlement
agreement for both new and existing power plants.328 EPA officials
realized that they would have to proceed with new sources first and
delay action on existing ones.329 Setting standards for the existing fleet
of older coal- and natural gas-fired power plants, it became clear,
would raise a number of difficult issues and invite substantial
controversy. The agency would need to convene a stakeholder process
and do extensive outreach, which realistically could not happen before
the 2012 presidential election. It was also clear that a proposal of this
importance would require explicit White House backing. So, in 2012,
EPA officials issued the proposal for new sources, and “hibernated”
until after the election.330
In his second term, President Obama re-engaged on climate
change. He told Gina McCarthy that climate action was the reason he
wanted her to lead the agency331 and appointed Denis McDonough, a
known climate hawk, as Chief of Staff.332 Obama, more than ever,
327. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490, 49,492 (Aug. 16, 2012)
(estimating reduction of 1.0 million tons of methane as a non-monetized benefit of the rule). See
also id. at 49,513 (noting that EPA is “not taking final action with respect to regulation of
methane” but acknowledging that “the control measures that the EPA is requiring for VOC result
in substantial methane reductions as a co-benefit”).
328. Petitioners had originally filed suit in 2006 to challenge EPA’s omission of CO2 from its
New Source Performance Standards for powerplants. After the Supreme Court decided
Massachusetts v. EPA in 2007, EPA sought a voluntary remand to reconsider its exclusion of CO2.
In 2010, the agency entered settlement agreements promising to establish a rulemaking schedule
for greenhouse gas standards for refineries and power plants. Settlement Agreement, New York
v. EPA, No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2010); Settlement Agreement, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA,
No. 08-1277 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2010). For background, see MARTEN LAW, supra note 307. The
consent decrees, both issued on December 23, 2010, covered two distinct categories of sources:
boilers and petroleum refineries. See Nathan Richardson, EPA Greenhouse Gas Performance
Standards: What the Settlement Agreement Means, Resources for the Future (Feb. 2011),
https://perma.cc/8GUR-NGWR (describing the consent decrees and their effects).
329. Goffman Interview, supra note 315.
330. Proposed Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. 60); Goffman Interview, supra note 315.
331. McCarthy Interview, supra note 317.
332. See Carol Davenport, The Man Who Could Put Climate Change on the Agenda,
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Apr. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/9U3L-6UZA. Neither Rahm Emanuel, nor
Bill Daley, Obama’s first two Chief of Staffs, were regarded by senior officials at EPA as having
a deep commitment to climate change.
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viewed climate change as part of his legacy. His 2013 State of the Union
speech again pledged that if Congress would not act, he would use
executive power.333 By June, the White House had announced a
comprehensive Climate Action Plan as a roadmap for his second
term.334 There were regular climate events planned to maintain
momentum and keep the Plan in the news. Now, the EPA
Administrator was not the only one talking about climate risks; the
Joint Chiefs were too.335 The White House climate and energy brief
belonged to Obama’s Counselor, former Clinton Chief of Staff John
Podesta, a deeply experienced political operator with unquestioned
stature. And upon his departure in 2015 to lead Hillary Clinton’s
presidential campaign, the role went to Brian Deese, a young White
House star, whom the president trusted to get things done.336 Together,
Podesta, McDonough, and Deese would provide crucial support for
McCarthy and her agency as EPA delivered major climate rules.337
EPA’s most important climate initiative of the second term was,
by far, the rulemaking to limit carbon dioxide from the nation’s existing
power plants, known as the Clean Power Plan,338 which the president
directed the agency to finalize by 2015.339 As EPA had anticipated
before the election, setting standards for the existing fleet would be a
hugely controversial rulemaking, consuming countless hours of

333. See Barack Hussein Obama, Second Inaugural Presidential Address (Jan. 21, 2013);
President Barack Hussein Obama, The State of the Union Address by the President of the United
States (Feb. 12, 2013) (“I urge this Congress to get together, pursue a bipartisan, market-based
solution to climate change . . . [b]ut if Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations, I
will.”).
334. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (June
2013), https://perma.cc/JH8K-583F [hereinafter OBAMA CLIMATE ACTION PLAN].
335. “The president had established a green cabinet and he would sit at the head of the table
and tell them they had to participate.” McCarthy Interview, supra note 317.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. EPA had initiated the rule for new sources in 2012, but now withdrew it and re-proposed
standards for both new and existing sources. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Generating
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (October
23, 2015).
339. The President’s Climate Action Plan had included a separate Presidential Memorandum
directing EPA to set carbon standards for powerplants using its Clean Air Act Authority,
specifying deadlines, and instructing the agency to conduct broad stakeholder outreach. OBAMA
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 334.
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painstaking work by senior career staff and political appointees,
including the EPA Administrator herself.340
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act defines performance standards
as the level of emission control achievable by applying the “best system
of emission reduction” that the Administrator determines has been
“adequately demonstrated,” taking into account energy requirements
among other considerations.341 EPA first issued a standard for new
power plants under the Clean Air Act based on the successful
demonstration of carbon capture and sequestration technology at sites
in the U.S. and Canada.342 That first rule was most significant, however,
because it would trigger regulation of existing power plants343—the far
more important regulatory target, since the oldest and dirtiest power
plants produce the largest share of electricity sector greenhouse gas
emissions.344
In the Clean Power Plan, EPA adopted a broad interpretation of
“best system,” which conceived of power plants as interconnected, as
if they were a single giant machine. The agency considered the CO2
reductions achievable if electric utilities took advantage of the same
broad set of opportunities they already had been using on the
regionally-interconnected electricity grids to meet pollution limits for
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.345 Following this approach, EPA set
separate emission limits for coal and gas-fired plants, which they
calculated by applying three factors: (1) the potential emission
reductions achievable by improving the efficiency of the units
themselves; (2) additional emission reductions achievable by
340. The effort was organized and managed by Assistant Administrator Janet McCabe. The
key architects were a team of core staff from the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards,
the Office of Atmospheric Programs, and the Office of General Counsel, coordinated by
Associate Assistant Administrator for Climate and Senior Counsel, Joe Goffman. Goffman
Interview, supra note 315.
341. See CLEAN AIR ACT § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (defining “standard of
performance”).
342. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015)
[hereinafter CPP Final Rule].
343. Section 111(d) requires the states to set performance standards for existing sources of a
pollutant when: (1) standards have been set for that pollutant from new sources; (2) the pollutant
is not already subject to regulation under the national ambient air quality program; and (3) when
it is emitted from a source not already regulated under the air toxics program. CLEAN AIR ACT
§ 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).
344. CLEAN AIR ACT § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012); Steven Mufson, Vintage U.S.
Coal-Fired Power Plants Now an ‘Aging Fleet of Clunkers’, WASH. POST (June 13, 2014),
https://perma.cc/BM59-98AD.
345. CPP Final Rule, supra note 342.
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substituting natural-gas fired electricity for coal-fired electricity; and
(3) reductions achievable by displacing both coal- and gas-fired units
with more renewable energy.346
This approach to “best system,” which contemplated fuel
substitution, was controversial. Broadening emission reduction
opportunities beyond the so-called “fence-line” of the powerplant to
include the greater opportunities presented by grid management
strategies would inevitably produce stricter standards than taking a
narrower view that looks only at efficiency improvements made locally
at the source. But EPA reasoned that its approach reflected how the
grid already worked in practice.347 In any event, ambition was the point:
EPA wanted to build on the shift from coal to natural gas-fired power
already underway in the electricity sector, which was the result of the
fracking revolution, and the trend toward renewable energy spurred by
state renewable portfolio standards, and other policies. The Clean
Power Plan would send a strong market signal to cement that shift,
support state renewable and energy efficiency policies, and, EPA
believed, drive emissions reductions deeper over time.348 EPA thought
its interpretation of “best system” was reasonable, appropriate, and
legally defensible. But the agency knew that it would be sued.
Finalizing the Clean Power Plan was a massive undertaking. EPA
staff conducted innumerable meetings with various stakeholders in an
unprecedented outreach effort and received hundreds of thousands of
comments on its proposal. Administrator McCarthy pushed her staff
hard to complete the rulemaking on the schedule the President had laid
out, ahead of the international climate meeting in Paris, knowing the
U.S. would rely on it for negotiating leverage to achieve an
international climate agreement. 349

346. Id.
347. In EPA’s view, there was no logical reason why performance standards in section 111
must be limited to engineering solutions that can be installed to units on-site, if off-site measures
might reduce emissions from such units cost-effectively. See CPP Final Rule, supra note 342, at
64,717–811 (describing EPA’s approach to Best System of Emission Reduction and its “building
block” methodology).
348. “The CPP was a market signal that said, this will be the least that will happen. That’s
what you do with regulations— signal where you need to head. The utilities are smart and can
figure it out. It also gave them an excuse to make politically controversial decisions in states where
they operate, to shut down old units and blame us.” McCarthy Interview, supra note 317.
349. Id.
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E. The Paris Agreement and the Obama Legacy
At the Paris climate talks in 2015, nearly 200 nations pledged to
mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions.350The Agreement was one of
the Obama administration’s signature achievements. Its design had
overcome the structural limitations of the Kyoto Protocol by
committing all of the world’s major economies, for the first time, to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, lower the carbon intensity of
their economies, and shift to cleaner energy.351 .
The agreement was also a victory for EPA. Along with the vehicle
emission standards set in the first term, the Obama administration
relied on projected reductions from the Clean Power Plan to set U.S.
targets. These two EPA policies were key pillars of the U.S.
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions between 26 and 28
percent by 2025, compared to 2005 levels.352
When President Obama left office, he had done more on climate
change than any of his predecessors, and the success was largely due to
the career staff and political appointees at EPA. While the president’s
Climate Action Plan had included many measures led by other
agencies, its two signature domestic policies - the vehicle greenhouse
gas and fuel efficiency standards and the Clean Power Plan - relied on
EPA.353 The administration had taken a sector-by-sector approach,
rather than the economy-wide plan envisioned by the WaxmanMarkey bill, and brought nearly two-thirds of the nation’s emissions
under a regulatory framework. EPA had adopted, in addition, rules to
control methane leaks from oil and gas facilities, and replace, at least

350. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104, https://perma.cc/4UWL-2DVA [hereinafter Paris
Agreement].
351. The agreement is voluntary—each State decides how much progress it can achieve
domestically, which is the basis for its pledge. This “pledge and review” design was meant to
ensure that, unlike Kyoto, the agreement would be durable, flexible, and increasingly effective
over timeFor an overview and assessment of the Paris Agreement, see Sue Biniaz, The Paris
Agreement – Au Revoir?, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL CLIMATE LAW BLOG (May 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/F7X4-AX8Q (describing and responding to common criticisms of the Accord);
Sue Biniaz, The Paris Agreement at Three Years Old, The Doctor’s Report, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY LAW PROGRAM (Dec. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/XG3537RU (reviewing the history of the Paris Agreement and assessing its performance to date).
352. UNITED STATES, INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION SUBMITTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ART. 4, PARA. 12 OF PARIS AGREEMENT (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://perma.cc/UF89-AR4A. While the U.S. had no obligation to achieve its pledge through
these two policies, it was widely expected that they would be implemented.
353. OBAMA CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 334.
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incrementally, hydrofluorocarbons.354 And it had issued air pollution
rules, like the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards and the Cross-State
Pollution Rule, which had collateral climate benefits.355 Without
question, at the end of Obama’s tenure, EPA was firmly ensconced as
the lead federal agency for U.S. climate policy.
All of this would change drastically after the 2016 presidential
election.
VI. Donald J. Trump
Soon after taking office, President Trump began dismantling the
Obama climate legacy. He revoked the Obama Climate Action Plan356
and announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the Paris
Agreement.357 The Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan would
never be implemented.358 After the rule was stayed by the Supreme
Court—and while it was pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of appeals—
President Trump issued an executive order directing EPA to review it
for consistency with the administration’s “energy dominance” agenda,

354. In the fall of 2016, the U.S. delegation, led by EPA Administrator McCarthy, negotiated
the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, creating a global framework to comprehensively
phase-out hydroflourocarbons. U.N. Env’t Programme, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.28/12, Annex I (Nov. 15, 2016); Coral Davenport, Nations, Fighting Powerful
Refrigerant That Warms Planet, Reach Landmark Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2016),
https://perma.cc/P8JT-463R.
355. See, e.g., Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,826 (Dec. 20, 2000); Federal
Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction
of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011); National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants From Coal and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards
of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial Institutional, and
Small Industrial Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9,303 (Feb. 16,
2012); Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012).
356. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017) (“Promoting Energy
Independence and Economic Growth”).
357. Letter from Nikki Haley, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations (Aug. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/RZC8-3RBF.
358. After the Supreme Court took the extraordinary step of staying the rule before the D.C.
circuit’s three-judge panel had heard oral argument, the D.C. Circuit opted to hear the case en
banc. After that day-long argument, the consensus view among experts was that a majority of the
full court likely would vote uphold the rule, over what was expected to be a strong dissent from
then-Judge Kavanaugh. See, e.g., Harvard Law’s Lazarus and Freeman discuss federal court
power plan hearing, E&ETV (Apr. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/F86B-LBY9; Jonathan H. Adler,
The en banc D.C. Circuit Meets the Clean Power Plan, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://perma.cc/X8A2-2BTX. But see Robinson Meyer, How Obama Could Lose His Big Climate
Case, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/M5VR-CQQ7.
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and the Department of Justice asked the D.C. Circuit to suspend the
litigation. 359 No court would ever rule on its legality. EPA eventually
rescinded the rule and substituted a far more modest proposal based
on a narrower reading of “best system” that required only marginal onsite efficiency upgrades.360 By EPA’s own estimates, its new standards
would achieve, at best, a 1.5% emission reduction—at worst, they
could increase emissions.361 The replacement rule also delegates
discretion to the states over whether and to what extent to limit power
plant carbon dioxide emissions.362
The Trump administration also embarked on a mission to revoke
or weaken other federal greenhouse gas rules.363 EPA rescinded
standards for methane emissions from oil and gas operations on private
and public land;364 lowered the greenhouse gas and fuel efficiency
standards for light duty vehicles (requiring only 1.5% annual fuel
economy improvement, down from 5% in the rescinded rule and, by
their own estimates, increasing both costs for consumers and
premature deaths).365 The agency also sought to disable California
from independently setting greenhouse gas standards for the transport
sector by revoking the state’s Clean Air Act preemption waiver to set
its own vehicle greenhouse gas standards and adopting the legal
position that California is permanently preempted from setting such

359. Notice of Executive Order, EPA Review of Clean Power Plan and Forthcoming
Rulemaking, and Motion to Hold Case in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 28, 2017).
360. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).
361. Id. at 32, 534–32, 541 (discussing EPA’s BSER findings under the new ACE Rule).
362. Id. at 32, 561 (Table 3) (showing projected CO2, SO2 and NOX Electricity Sector
Emission Impacts).
363. For a list of these initiatives, see HARVARD L. SCH. ENV’TL & ENERGY L. PROGRAM,
REGULATORY ROLLBACK TRACKER, https://perma.cc/E27V-SP7R (select “View the live page”
at the top of the perma link for a live view).
364. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and
Modified Sources Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 57,018 (Sep. 14, 2020) (rescinding Obama-era regulations
of methane gas emissions for oil-and-gas producers); Waste Prevention, Production Subject to
Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed.
Reg. 49,184 (Sep. 28, 2018) (rescinding in part the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule, eliminating
measures that would have resulted in natural gas savings). BLM’s Revised Rule was vacated in a
recent district court decision, which is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. California v.
Bernhardt, No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 WL 4001480 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020), sub. nom. Cal.
Air Res. Bd. v. Am. Petrol. Inst., No. 20-16801 (9th Cir. Sep. 17, 2020).
365. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020).
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standards by the Energy Policy Conservation Act.366 The Department
of Justice also launched a preliminary antitrust investigation into four
auto companies that had voluntarily agreed to ignore the federal
rollback and meet California’s vehicle standards voluntarily.367 In
addition to these specific deregulatory actions, the administration
sought to undermine the scientific basis for EPA rules—for example,
by replacing qualified experts on its advisory committees, excluding
relevant science from its decision-making, changing its regulatory
benefit calculations, and limiting the scientific information it shares
with the public.368
The administration did not fare well in litigation challenging its
regulatory rollbacks. Courts rejected EPA decisions to suspend or
delay rule implementation, finding that the agency had failed to follow
required legal procedures.369 The agency lost other cases on the merits,
for being arbitrary.370 However, litigation challenging the most

366. Letter from Stephen G. Bradbury, General Counsel, U.S. Department of
Transportation, and Matthew Z. Leopold, General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency,
to Mary Nichols, Chair, California Air Resources Board (Sept. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/X2WYRPW7.
367. Timothy Puko & Ben Foldy, Justice Department Launches Antitrust Probe into Four
Auto Makers, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/8CQ9-QK2V. The Department of
Justice also sought to block California’s agreement with Quebec to jointly implement an
emissions trading regime to reduce greenhouse gases, though that effort has so far failed. United
States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142, 2020 WL 4043034 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2020) (on appeal as
of this writing).
368. For a list of initiatives intended to undermine EPA’s core capacities, see HARVARD L.
SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM, EPA MISSION TRACKER, https://perma.cc/GHW6F9ZY (select “View the live page” at the top of the perma link for a live view).
369. See, e.g., Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The real reason the Trump administration is
constantly losing in court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/LQB5-7KLB (“Federal
judges have ruled against the Trump administration at least 63 times over the past two years, an
extraordinary record of legal defeat that has stymied large parts of the president’s agenda on the
environment, immigration and other matters. In case after case, judges have rebuked Trump
officials for failing to follow the most basic rules of governance for shifting policy, including
providing legitimate explanations supported by facts and, where required, public input.”). The
Institute for Policy Integrity at the New York University School of Law found that the Trump
administration has lost 87% of challenges to its regulations, guidance documents, and agency
memoranda. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, Inst. Pol’y Integrity (Sep. 23,
2020), https://perma.cc/ADT8-BFWK (finding Trump administration has lost 87% of challenges
to its regulations guidance documents, and agency memoranda); see also Samantha Gross, What
is the Trump administration’s track record on the environment?, BROOKINGS (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://perma.cc/58WL-VMYN.
370. See, e.g., Physicians for Social Responsibility v. Wheeler, 2020 WL 1921539 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (striking down an EPA directive prohibiting scientists in receipt of certain EPA grants from
serving on EPA’s federal advisory committees). See Scott Pruitt, Strengthening and Improving
Membership on EPA Federal Advisory Committee (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/NA77-QKPK;
see also Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration is Constantly
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important Trump policy reversals related to climate change—including
the new powerplant, fuel efficiency, and methane standards—is still
pending.371
At the time of writing, Joe Biden has won the 2020 presidential
election, but has yet to be sworn in as President. The results of the
election are hugely consequential for many reasons—because of the
covid-19 pandemic and the economic havoc it has wreaked, but also
because of the impact on federal climate policy. Had President Trump
won re-election, the litigation over his climate change rules would have
played out. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and perhaps the
Supreme Court, would have decided, for example, whether the Trump
EPA’s narrow view of its authority to regulate existing powerplants
within the fence line is the only correct view of the Clean Air Act, and
likely would have ruled on the administration’s theory that California
is preempted from regulating transportation sector greenhouse gases.
While these issues may one day reach the courts, the Department
of Justice in the incoming Biden administration will, no doubt, request
that pending litigation be held in abeyance until the agencies can
reconsider the underlying rules.372 And presumably, based on his
campaign positions, President Biden will reverse the Trump reversals,
shifting back to a more ambitious greenhouse gas regulatory

Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/LQB5-7KLB (describing
administration losses and highlighting environmental cases).
371. On October 8, 2020, the D.C. Circuit heard oral argument in the challenge to EPA’s
rescission of the Clean Power Plan and its replacement with the Affordable Clean Energy Rule.
See Order, Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, No. 19-1140 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2020). Other challenges are
still being briefed at the time of writing, such as litigation over EPA & NHTSA’s SAFE Vehicles
Rule. See California v. Wheeler, No. 20-01167 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2020); Order, Union of
Concerned Scientists v. NHTSA, No. 19-1230 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 2020) (briefing completed Oct.
27, 2020). EPA Methane Rollbacks were finalized in September 2020, see Oil and Natural Gas
Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Review, 85 Fed. Reg.
57,018 (Sep. 14, 2020) (codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission
Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Reconsideration, 85 Fed. Reg. 57,398
(Sep. 15, 2020) (codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), and are facing challenges in the D.C. Circuit. EDF
v. Wheeler, No. 20-01359 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 14, 2020). BLM’s 2018 Revision Rule, rescinding the
bulk of the 2016 Methane Waste Prevention Rule, was vacated by the Northern District of
California. California v. Bernhardt, No. 4:18-cv-05712 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020). This decision has
revived litigation over the 2016 Rule, which will come into effect on October 13, 2020, unless it is
stayed or vacated by another court before that date. Order Lifting Stay, Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, No. 2:16-CV-00285 (D. Wyo. July 21, 2020) (briefing completed Sep. 4, 2020);
BLM, Methane & Waste Prevention Rule, https://perma.cc/XB7V-PCH2.
372. Courts have historically acceded to such requests. See, e.g., Order Granting Abeyance,
West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2017) (involving challenge to CPP and
granted even after oral argument); Order Granting Abeyance, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, No. 131108 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017) (involving challenge to oil and gas methane standards).
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program.373 The new administration will be looking to do so while
minimizing legal risks, and preventing, to the extent possible, the
adverse outcomes described above.
CONCLUSION
I.

The Limits of Agency Power

The first lesson from this account is that EPA’s handling of climate
change essentially tracks congressional and presidential politics, which
should not be surprising, since executive branch agencies are creatures
of statute, answerable to congressional oversight committees, the
president, and the courts. During the 1970s and 1980s, the agency
conducted research into the greenhouse effect at a time when both
Congress, and the presidents of that era, viewed the issue as longerterm. In the Clinton administration, EPA developed voluntary
initiatives to reduce greenhouse gases; supported the administration’s
work to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol; and, toward the end of the
second term, issued a legal opinion asserting regulatory authority over
greenhouse gases. But realistically, even in the late 1990s, EPA was in
no position to take the next step and set standards: The White House
had lost the battle on the Kyoto Protocol, and congressional opposition
was fierce. Whatever momentum was building at the end of the Clinton
administration would require a Gore presidency to come to fruition.
That hope was extinguished by George W. Bush, who very
conspicuously abandoned the climate issue.
The Supreme Court’s 2007 ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA shifted
the momentum again by confirming that climate change fit within
EPA’s mission, opening the door to greenhouse gas regulation. Still, it
took a committed president to back the agency with his own political
capital to move federal policy a quantum leap forward. Obama made
clear that he was prepared to use executive power to reduce
greenhouse gases if Congress did not act, and he made good on that
commitment by the end of his two terms.374 As a result, for a time, the

373. The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental
Justice, https://perma.cc/Q47D-VWD8; The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable
Infrastructure and an Equitable Clean Energy Future, https://perma.cc/WE7K-5KPC.
374. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that greenhouse gases are
pollutants under the Clean Air Act and rejecting EPA’s reasons for refusing to make the
threshold endangerment finding under Clean Air Act § 202). For a comprehensive account of the
Massachusetts v. EPA litigation see LAZARUS, supra note 193.
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Clean Air Act would serve as the U.S. government’s most potent
instrument for tackling climate change.375
The evolution toward regulating greenhouse as pollutants may
seem entirely natural in retrospect, but as this account makes clear, it
was not inevitable. The EPA administrators from the 1970s, 80s, and
90s whom I interviewed for this article—without in any way
diminishing the importance of climate change—said that they had
other pressing issues to manage when taking over the agency and that
existing statutory mandates, court deadlines, budget imperatives, and
other near-term crises dominated their tenures.376 Climate change
seemed abstract and theoretical compared to many other concrete and
compelling environmental problems, like chemical soups seeping into
people’s basements, pesticides poisoning the food supply, deadly local
air pollution, and highly polluted rivers catching on fire. Stratospheric
ozone depletion and acid deposition had more immediate and visible
consequences and commanded more urgent attention.
A number of administrators who led the agency over the decades,
both Republican and Democratic, deserve credit for the things they did
do, which directly or indirectly helped to lay the foundation for EPA
to take a leadership role on climate. Lee Thomas courageously
advocated within President Reagan’s cabinet for the Montreal
Protocol, which set a precedent for international environmental
cooperation and helped to cultivate expertise in the agency that would
later prove critical on climate policy. The agency’s experience on ozone
depletion helped EPA to build crucial relationships with the State
Department, which would bear fruit in later international negotiations
on climate. Bill Reilly, a natural globalist and big thinker, pressed hard
for a stronger U.S. commitment to the Rio Convention, despite
concerted efforts by senior White House aides to torpedo his efforts.
That agreement launched the international process that would
ultimately lead, after twists and turns, to the 2015 Paris Agreement.
In the Clinton administration, a fast-thinking Carol Browner, put
on the spot in a hostile congressional hearing, answered yes to the
375. Over the course of two terms, the agency deployed its authority under the Clean Air
Act to issue the first federal standards for greenhouse gas emissions from both the transportation
and electric power sectors, which represented at the time nearly two-thirds of the economy’s
emissions. These steps also helped to create the domestic foundation for the U.S. pledge to the
international climate change accord known as the Paris Agreement, signed by most of the world’s
governments in 2015.
376. In virtually every administration, EPA administrators took over the agency only to
encounter some crisis. This includes Love Canal, the Bhopal disaster, the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and more.

freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2020]

THE EPA’S ROLE IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY

2/11/2021 10:53 AM

71

surprise question whether EPA had authority over carbon dioxide—
even before she had a legal opinion to that effect. Although Browner
herself had prioritized regulating conventional pollutants during her
tenure, her instinctive reaction to Delay’s provocation was a crucial
first step toward EPA ultimately issuing the first federal rules to
regulate greenhouse gases, though no one at the time, including
Browner, imagined how that process might unfold.
Christine Todd Whitman advocated for a “four pollutant bill” to
regulate CO2 from the power sector and fought to restore U.S.
leadership in international climate negotiations but was blocked by the
White House. Lisa Jackson repaired the all-important “endangerment
finding,” the scientific basis and legal predicate for regulating, and
presided over the first federal greenhouse gas rules in the United
States. Her successor, Gina McCarthy, built on that beginning, with the
support of the White House, to fully leverage the power of the Clean
Air Act.
These administrators might be faulted for not doing more, but as
we have seen, they were constrained by the political contexts of their
time. It is a lesson: executive branch agencies in the United States’
constitutional system are creatures of statute, answerable to their
congressional overseers, the president, and the courts. They cannot
afford to stick their necks out too far for fear of losing their heads.
II. Climate Regulation versus Climate Legislation
The second lesson is that regulation, while a powerful tool, is less
durable than legislation. It is typical to see regulatory pendulum swings
between administrations of different parties—with Democratic
administrations tending to support stronger environmental regulation
that Republican administrations describe as too burdensome and tend
to roll back. These swings are possible because courts have
traditionally afforded significant—though not unbounded—discretion
to agencies to administer the statutes Congress has entrusted to them,
including by filling gaps, ambiguities and silences, on the theory that
Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated that power to agencies,
and not to courts, in the first instance, and that both agency expertise
and democratic accountability norms also support allowing agencies
certain interpretive leeway.377 Reviewing courts also generally allow
agencies significant room to make policy decisions—such as setting

377. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (explaining when an
agency’s interpretation of a statute should receive deference).
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regulatory standards more or less stringently—subject to review only
for arbitrariness. And agencies may pursue their enforcement
priorities largely as they see fit.378 Due to these doctrines, agency
policies can shift significantly from one administration to the next.
Regulatory standards can tighten, only to loosen again, every four to
eight years. The Trump administration’s deregulatory program was an
exaggerated version of this dynamic, and it highlights the vulnerability
of agency rules to reversal. Executive power alone is an unstable basis
for climate policy.
Agencies like EPA, in particular, face rigorous judicial scrutiny as
they seek to adapt old laws to new developments, which they believe
fall within their jurisdiction and must be addressed as part of their
mission but which Congress did not fully anticipate or design for.379 The
Supreme Court has increasingly taken a more skeptical posture toward
deferring to agencies in such instances, viewing it as more appropriate
to send what they consider to be major questions of social and
economic importance back to Congress for a clear statement of its
views.380 While entirely sensible-sounding on its face, this theory of
interpretation can frustrate the goals of broadly-framed statutes
adopted by an earlier enacting majority and disable agencies from
doing all but the most incremental things. And because it is hard to
pass legislation—and getting ever harder in an era of unprecedented
partisanship—this approach, adopted systematically, is a one-way
ratchet to regulatory stasis.
EPA became so central to U.S. climate policy because Congress
refused to act. The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA
and the follow-on case American Electric Power v. Connecticut ratified
the agency’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases.381 Yet the

378. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)
(emphasizing that agencies must be given “ample latitude” to adapt policies to changing
circumstances); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (discussing presumption of
unreviewability for agency decision not to enforce).
379. See, e.g., FCC’s Net Neutrality Rule, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80
Fed. Reg. 19,737 (Apr. 13, 2015) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 1, 8, 20). The FCC has to adapt the
1996 Telecom Act to deal with modern challenges posed by the internet and must classify the
internet using categories created before it existed. See id. at 19,744 (reclassifying broadband
Internet access service as a telecommunications service under Title II of the Communications
Act).
380. See e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Util. Air
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
381. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (finding Clean Air Act’s
delegation of authority to EPA to regulate greenhouse gases displaced federal common law public
nuisance claims for harms from climate change).
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flexibility EPA has to manage greenhouse gases may be shrinking
because the Court’s composition has changed. The majority of Justices
on the Court now appear to adhere to a brand of textualism that
requires agencies to root every exertion of regulatory authority in clear
and explicit statutory text. The Court has increasingly portrayed
agencies as dangerous behemoths, with vast regulatory powers that
must be checked to a greater extent by the courts.382 It will be harder,
going forward, for a president wanting to act on climate change to use
executive power in bold ways, such as interpreting existing statutes like
the Clean Air Act expansively. In the absence of congressional action,
the Supreme Court will have the last say on federal climate policy. As
a result, perhaps the strongest blow President Trump will have dealt to
climate policy, is his appointment of three conservative Justices who
are skeptical of the administrative state.383

382. See City of Arlington, Tex. V. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (“Where Congress has
established a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where Congress has established an
ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.”); see also
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (“But
the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core
judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little
difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to face
the behemoth.”). In recent years, the Court has shown an openness to striking down statutes that
delegate agencies broad power without sufficient legislative guidance. See, e.g., Gundy v. United
States. 189 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) The Court has also voted to vastly limit deference to agency
interpretations of their own ambiguous rules. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019)
(holding that Auer deference is limited when agencies interpret their own ambiguous rules). A
majority of Justices have also shown a growing antipathy to the idea that agencies should get
deference for reasonable interpretations of statutes even after a court has spoken, as long as the
court has not precluded the agency’s reading. See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n
v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (arguing that if the Court has ruled that
there is only one lawful way to read a statute, then that reading blocks a new administration’s
preferred interpretation).
383. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Hulac, Environmental Action, Laws May Face New Hurdles on
HighCcourt, ROLL CALL (Sep. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/FX4T-2GT7; Michael Livermore,
Judge Kavanaugh and the Environment, SCOTUSBLOG (July 18, 2018 1:27 PM),
https://perma.cc/R4ZP-G7VR; Peter J. Henning, Gorsuch Nomination Puts Spotlight on Agency
Powers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/J4UG-48FC; Evan Bernick, Judge Amy
Coney Barrett on Statutory Interpretation: Textualism, Precedent, Judicial Restraint, and the Future
of Chevron, YALE J. REGUL. NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (July 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/7NMMVXS4. Jody Freeman, What Amy Coney Barrett’s Confirmation Will Mean for Environmental
Law and Joe Biden’s Climate Plan, Vox (Oct. 21, 2020 12:30 PM), https://perma.cc/4BJP-BQN2.
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III. The Connection between Domestic and International Climate
Policy
A third lesson from this account is the tight linkage between
domestic and international climate policy.384 Climate change seems to
have been viewed by EPA throughout the 1980s and 1990s as a matter
appropriately addressed by an international treaty akin to the
Montreal Protocol. Once ratified, a treaty would, in turn, require
implementing legislation, which would lead, ultimately, to domestic
regulation. That view—that an international solution would come first
and drive domestic policy—largely persisted into the Clinton
administration.
But EPA evolved in its thinking and came to see climate change
as properly falling within its existing authority. That period, toward the
tail end of the Clinton years, during which EPA began to consider
potential regulatory tools, turns out, in retrospect, to be a crucial pivot
point in the history of American and, indeed, global climate policy.385
After the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA became
the federal agency with the greatest potential to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions via regulation. The Obama EPA delivered on that
promise, by making the endangerment finding, and issuing federal
greenhouse gas standards for the transportation and power sectors.
This development coincided with a significant shift in U.S.
diplomatic strategy: in the years after the Kyoto Protocol, it became
clear that to attract broad-based support, a new approach to an
international climate accord would be necessary, one that could
accommodate the distinctions in national circumstances among the
world’s major economies. Rather than Kyoto’s stark divide between
Annex I (“developed”) countries, which were subject to targets and
timetables, and non-Annex I (“developing”) countries, which were
384. Asked about what lessons might be drawn from the UNFCCC negotiations, Reinstein
said, “Work the domestic process simultaneously with, not after, you do your negotiations. Know
what you can deliver, what you can actually ratify and implement honestly before you agree to
anything. Know how much it’s going to cost, who’s going to pay. . .And consult with the people
who are going to be affected, who are the ones whose businesses and lives are going to be affected,
and the people who represent them in the [C]ongress.” Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy of
Robert Reinstein & Stephanie Kinney (Oct. 5, 2010) at 56
385. The Clean Air Act of 1990 was critical to the U.S.’s ability to ratify the Montreal
Protocol because “it was the treaty-implementing legislation for the U.S.” Interview of Reinstein
& Kinney, supra note 384, at 31. Targets in original protocol were negotiated simultaneously with
industry and Congress so coming home from Montreal, ratification was guaranteed. All of the
stakeholders had already been included in the process. Not so with climate. Climate change is not
like the ozone issue, where there were “eight chemicals, 90% of them manufactured by six
companies in the world.” Id.
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exempted from new commitments, a more inclusive agreement would
need to be flexible, allowing for a variety of national situations.386 What
emerged was a “pledge and review” approach, which allowed each
Party to design its own commitment, in light of its unique domestic
capacities and political context. As a result, the relevant question for
the U.S. became, what could be achieved domestically to provide the
basis for an international pledge? This switch from a top-down to a
bottom-up process made EPA essential. Now that the agency could
harness the Clean Air Act, it had the regulatory power to deliver
significant emissions reductions toward the U.S. pledge.
This experience shows that domestic action can drive international
climate progress rather than the other way around. The more we are
prepared to do, the more leverage we will have with other nations. By
the same token, our credibility internationally hinges on our ability to
deliver meaningful emission reductions through domestic policies.
What we pledge to the international community, and when we can
pledge it, will need to be timed to coincide with, and aligned with, our
domestic political agenda. With a conservative Supreme Court likely
to cabin EPA’s power to regulate greenhouse gases going forward, it
will be more challenging than ever to generate the scale of reductions
necessary using only the president’s executive authority. (Even the
additional contribution from states, cities, and leading private sector
companies, cannot accomplish the deep, economy-wide reductions that
ambitious national policy could.) Congress must pass climate and clean
energy legislation, if we hope to strengthen the Paris Agreement.
IV. Climate Change is Hard
The final lesson is that global climate change is an unprecedented
policy challenge with no ready analog. Despite a passing resemblance,
it is comparable neither to stratospheric ozone depletion nor acid
deposition, both environmental policy challenges of international
scope and consequence, but which aroused more intense public
concern more quickly and for which there were readier solutions.387
386. See generally, Susan Biniaz, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., I Beg to Differ:
Taking Account of National Circumstances under the Paris Agreement, the ICAO Market-Based
Measure, and the Montreal Protocol’s HFC Amendment (2017), https://perma.cc/7GTP-4A2S.
387. For example, in the case of ozone depletion, the risk of skin cancer was a direct prod to
action: scientists had produced “smoking gun” evidence linking ozone deterioration to chlorine
gases traceable to everyday consumer products like freon used in refrigeration and aerosols used
in deodorant and hairspray; and major industry players like Dupont, ultimately supported a
phase-out of ozone-depleting substances once they had developed substitutes ahead of their
European competitors. Interview of Reinstein & Kinney, supra note 384, at 72. For acid
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Global warming is, by comparison, a more formidable problem with
much farther-reaching economic, social, political, and strategic
implications.
It is true that the basic science of the greenhouse effect was
understood by the American political elite in the 1970s. Yet awareness
alone was insufficient to make the problem ripe for policymaking. The
implications of the science took time to gel and disseminate beyond a
small cadre of informed experts.388 Second, while congressional
hearings on climate change began as early as the 1970s and intensified
in the 1980s,389 and although a subset of prominent members of
Congress—with names like Baucus, Bentsen, Chaffee, Durenburger,
Gore, Leahy, Mitchell, Stafford, and Wirth—pressed for policies to
address the problem, introducing legislation is not the same as passing
it. It overstates things to suggest that Congress was on the precipice of
bold action then. Congress was only moved to call for more research,
not adopt a legislative plan to address global warming’s root causes.390
The economic and technological context of that time also tells part
of the story. In the late 1980s, the nation’s fleet of fossil fuel plants,
which represented billions of dollars of utility sector investments, was
a mix of mid-life and newer units, with many plants having come online
in the 1970s.391 The Carter administration had proposed, and Congress
had adopted, an energy policy that specifically subsidized, and in some
deposition, the number of sources was relatively few, there was available technology to control
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, and the solution required only regional cooperation. But see
Richard Benedick, Lessons from the Ozone Hole, 16 EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1990, at 41, 41–43 (1990)
(arguing that despite being more complex, global warming shares some attributes of the threat to
the ozone layer).
388. Pomerance, who helped to organize early congressional hearings working with staffers
and members on Capitol Hill, recalled that “in 1979 nobody who even knew term the greenhouse
effect. It took time to get this stuff out. It didn’t gel for a long time.” Telephone Interview with
Rafe Pomerance, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment and Development
(Mar. 12, 2019).
389. The first congressional hearings dedicated to climate change were in 1976. See generally
The National Climate Program Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Environment and the
Atmosphere of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 94th Cong. 1 (1976). There were also
hearings in 1977, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986 (at which EPA officials testified), 1987, 1988,
and 1989. James Hansen, the NASA scientist testified in 1982, 1986, and 1988 where he made his
famous statement that he was 99 percent certain that the warming trend was not a natural
variation but was caused by a buildup of carbon dioxide and other artificial gases in the
atmosphere, and that it is “already happening now.” Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has
Begun, Expert tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 1988), https://perma.cc/4GEX-3C8G.
390. See, e.g., Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1408,
1408–09 (1987) (establishing a policy to conduct more research on climate change).
391. Most Electric Generating Capacity Additions in the Last Decade Were Natural Gas-Fired,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 5, 2011), https://perma.cc/6ZQT-9QSV.
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circumstances required, coal use.392 Coal supplied over half of the
nation’s electric power,393 and the electricity sector was about to
embark on a process of deregulation, which, while it would ultimately
help to integrate renewable energy into the nation’s grids, initially
created new markets for and boosted the profitability of cheap coal.394
Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling had yet to be deployed at
scale to access the nation’s abundant natural gas reserves, which would
make relatively cleaner natural gas more competitive than coal for
electric power.395 A modest price on carbon, had Congress been able to
produce it, would have been helpful in promoting alternatives. But
renewable energy technologies, which had been rapidly developing for
only about ten years, still faced technical, institutional, and economic
barriers to broad deployment.396 The country’s transportation sector
was 97% dependent on oil, with not a glimmer of the electric vehicle
penetration potential we now see on the horizon.397 Oil prices in the 80s
and 90s were low, which did not help the quest for alternatives. It was
a very different era.
Some of the delay must be attributed to the doubt and confusion
sown by organizations like the Global Climate Coalition, which
worked assiduously to oppose regulation of greenhouse gases both
domestically and internationally. Oil and gas industry researchers had
conducted their own climate modeling in the 1970s and 1980s and
392. See e.g., Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8341(b), 8342(a),
8343; see generally, Erik Dryburgh, Coal Conversion and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978, 8 Ecology L. Q. 774, 776 & nn. 15–17 (1980).
393. September 2020 Monthly Energy Review, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 129 Table 7.2a
(Sep. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/7BBB-3FTT.
394. Between 1988 and 1990, FERC made several decisions approving market-based rates,
with only some assurances that the seller and any of its affiliates lack market power or mitigate
any existing market power. See, e.g., Ocean State Power, 44 FERC 61,261 (1988); Commonwealth
Atlantic Limited Partnership, 51 FERC 61,368 (1990); Citizens Power & Light Company, 48
FERC 61,210 (1989); see also Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.)
395. T. Wang, Cost of Coal and Natural Gas for Electric Generation in the U.S. from 1980 to
2018, STATISTA (Aug 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/9M37-Z3K9
396. See, e.g., Stanley R. Bull & Lynn L. Billman, Renewable Energy: Read to Meet Its
Promise?, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY (Dec. 7, 1998),
https://perma.cc/W8HF-LEFZ.
397. While electric vehicles were invented in the 19th Century and were a significant portion
of the early American vehicle market at the beginning of the 20th Century, they had all but
disappeared by the 1930s. There was a resurgence of interest in electric vehicles in the 1970s, but
significant market penetration began only after a renaissance in the 1990s. Rebecca Matulka, The
History of the Electric Car, DEPT. OF ENERGY (Sep. 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/8ZBN-GUAZ;
see also generally, DAVID KIRSCH, THE ELECTRIC VEHICLE AND THE BURDEN OF HISTORY
(2000).
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participated in domestic and international scientific meetings.
Privately, they agreed with the scientific consensus.398 Yet, once
regulation seemed more likely, the fossil fuel industry began a
campaign of obfuscation and obstruction aimed at delay.399 Exxon
(later ExxonMobil), which played a leading role in the coalition,
invested heavily in casting doubt about the validity of climate science
that its own internal documents revealed to be solid. These efforts by
all accounts succeeded in confusing the public, helped to politicize the
issue, and gave members of Congress an excuse not to act, even in the
face of ever-more compelling national and international scientific
assessments indicating that the global climate was warming primarily
as a result of human causes.400
Finally, climate change poses a profound global coordination
challenge. The fact that the developed world bears a disproportionate
share of historical responsibility for the problem, while the developing
world will be responsible for the majority of emissions going forward,
raises the vexing question of how to equitably allocate the burden of
reducing emissions, especially when access to adequate energy is still a
398. The history of Exxon conducting leading climate change science in the 1970s and 1980s,
and its pivot to undermining the science was described in a six-part series published by Inside
Climate News based largely on primary sources including Exxon’s own internal documents. See,
Neela Banerjee, Lisa Song & David Hasemyer, Exxon: The Road Not Taken, INSIDE CLIMATE
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/2GUK-AXRP (“Since the late 1970s, Exxon scientists
had been telling top executives that the most likely cause of climate change was carbon pollution
from the combustion of fossil fuels, and that it was important to get a grip on the problem quickly.
Exxon Research & Engineering had launched innovative ocean research from aboard the
company’s biggest supertanker, the Esso Atlantic. ER&E’s modeling experts, by the early 1980s,
had confirmed the consensus among outside scientists about the climate’s sensitivity to carbon
dioxide.”). Similar findings were reached independently by a team based at the Columbia
Journalism School in partnership with the Los Angeles Times. Sara Jerving, Katie Jennings,
Masako Melissa Hirsch & Susanne Rust, LA TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/2A2G-Q3KH.
399. See generally NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO
GLOBAL WARMING (2010); see also Neela Banerjee, Exxon’s Oil Industry Peers Knew About
Climate Dangers in the 1970s, Too, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://perma.cc/HL7F-83AW; Kathy Mulvey & Seth Shulman, The Climate Deception Dossiers:
Internal Fossil Fuel Industry Memos Reveal Decades of Corporate Disinformation, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (July 2015), https://perma.cc/89CD-R5W7.
400. On the evolution of the science, it took until Second IPCC Assessment for the
international body to announce without reservation the link between human activity and the
warming effect. IPCC, IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 xi (1995) (“[C]arbon
dioxide remains the most important contributor to anthropogenic forcing of climate change;
projections of future global mean temperature change and sea level rise confirm the potential for
human activities to alter the Earth’s climate to an extent unprecedented in human history; and
the long time-scales governing both the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and
the response of the climate system to those accumulations, means that many important aspects of
climate change are effectively irreversible.”).

freeman final real macros (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2020]

THE EPA’S ROLE IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY

2/11/2021 10:53 AM

79

challenge in many parts of the world. The hard question is how can we
efficiently, effectively and equitably replace a massive, costly, and
entrenched global energy system on which the world’s economies
currently depend?
We are in a better position to answer that question today, with
alternative energy technologies rapidly developing and dropping in
price;401 modern grids that possess the flexibility to integrate a
significant share of renewable energy and demand response—and
which, with the right scale of investment, could ultimately support a
largely electrified transportation fleet;402 and energy storage research
continuing apace.403 The public has now also suffered or witnessed
catastrophic event after catastrophic event—historic floods,
hurricanes, and fires—which, it can be shown, are made worse by rising
global temperatures. American industry generally, and the oil and gas
industry in particular, recognizes that they can no longer just say no.404
The 2020s are not the 1980s. We are ready, as a society, to tackle
climate change.
Going forward, EPA’s role in U.S. climate policy and greenhouse
gas regulation policy is uncertain. Congress may eventually adopt a
carbon tax, set an economy-wide cap on carbon, or take a sector-bysector approach to reducing emissions. But until Congress acts, EPA
will remain the default regulator, along with the leading states. If this
history teaches anything, it is that EPA career staff, dogged and
professional, will keep at it, within the constraints allowed by the
president, and subject to limits imposed by the federal courts.

401. Mike Scott, Solar And Wind Costs Continue To Fall As Power Becomes
Cleaner, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2020 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/C543-6F89; Average U.S
. Construction Costs for Solar and Wind Generation Continue to Fall, U.S. Energy Info.
Admin. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/WK57-BGYR.
402. Michael I. Henderson, et al., Electric Power Grid Modernization Trends, Challenges, and
Opportunities, IEEE (Nov. 2017), https://perma.cc/8T5T-8PLL; Mike O’Boyle, How A Smart
Grid Relies On Customer Demand Response To Manage Wind And Solar, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2017
1:03 PM), https://perma.cc/3ZLN-9N43.
403. See
generally,
Energy
Storage
Research, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB’Y, https://perma.cc/2ZTS-NMLC.
404. There is increasing bipartisan support among leading U.S. companies, including oil and
gas companies, for a carbon tax. CLC’s Mission, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP
COALITION, https://perma.cc/5QCL-T3MN.

